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L IMITED partnerships are relatively new to the common law countries in
relation to other business entities, although some form of limited part-
nership has been known to the civil law for centuries. The English rejected
attempts to form limited partnerships because of the prevailing common law
theory that a person who shared the profits of an enterprise must also share in
its losses.' The English view carried over to the United States and success-
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fully hampered the development of limited partnerships for many years.'
Because of the difficulty in obtaining a corporate charter in the period
preceding general corporation acts, and because of increased needs for
flexibility in business, pressure was exerted by businessmen to create an
accessible form of limited liability business structure.
The first United States Limited Partnership Act was passed by New York
in 1822. This statute, like many other early limited partnership acts, was based
in large part on the Napoleonic Code. Yet, despite legislative approval, courts
were hesitant to approve the "new" business structure.3 Adverting to the
English view that profit-sharing required loss-sharing, the courts construed
the acts strictly as being in derogation of the common law. Thus, very strict
attention to technicalities was required, with the result that limited liability, in
practice, was quite ephemeral.
In 1916 the Commissioners on Uniform State Laws proposed the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act (ULPA) for adoption by the states.' Underlying
ULPA was the theory that a willing investor should be able to put his money in
a limited partnership and depend on others for investment skills without
incurring any liability in the process. In fact, one of the comments to ULPA
notes:
The act proceeds on the assumption that no public policy requires a
person who contributes to the capital of a business, acquires an interest
in the profits, and some degree of control over the conduct of the
business, to become bound for the obligations of the business, provided
creditors have no reason to believe at the time their credits were
extended that such person was so bound.'
ULPA also reflects a desire to provide reasonable protection of commercial
expectations through a uniform system of regulation of limited partnerships. 6
Today forty-nine states, the District of Columbia, and the Virgin Islands have
enacted ULPA, 7 and Louisiana provides for partnerships in comrnmendam
which are similar to limited partnerships.8 Texas adopted ULPA in 1955 with
only a few minor changes. 9 In August 1976 the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws at their annual meeting approved and
recommended for enactment in all states a Revised Uniform Limited Partner-
ship Act (RULPA).1 °
2. England has since adopted a limited partnership law. Limited Partnership Act, 7 Edw. 7,
c. 24 (1907).
3. A. BROMBERG, CRANE & BROMBERG ON PARTNERSHIP § 26, at 143 n.22 (1968) [hereinafter
cited as BROMBERG]; see cases cited in id. § 26, at 144 n.25.
4. C. TERRY, UNIFORM STATE LAWS ANN. 33 (1920).
5. Lewis, The Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 65 U. PA. L. REV. 715, 723 (1917);
UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT § 1, Comment [hereinafter cited as ULPA].
6. ULPA § 28(b); Rathke v. Griffith, 35 Wash. 2d 394, 218 P.2d 757 (1950).
7. 6 UNIFORM LAWS ANN. 75 (Supp. 1976).
8. See Comment, Partnership in Commendam-Louisiana 's Limited Partnership, 35 TUL.
L. REV. 815 (1961).
9. Ch. 133, [1955] Tex. Laws 471, codified at TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132a (1970)
[hereinafter referred to and cited as TULPA]. As adopted in Texas, TULPA is essentially the
same as the national act, although the legislature made a few minor drafting changes and
numbered the Act differently.
10. Final copies of RULPA will be available from the office of the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, 645 North Michigan Avenue, Suite 510, Chicago, Illinois
60611. In Texas no attempt will be made to present RULPA to the legislature at its session
beginning January 1977. However, it is expected that RULPA will be presented to the Texas
Legislature in January 1979.
LIMITED PARTNERSHIP PLANNING
I. CHOOSING THE LIMITED PARTNERSHIP FORM
There are a number of business structures that may be selected: sole
proprietorships, general partnerships, corporations,11 and, of course, limited
partnerships. Each has its particular advantages and disadvantages from
business, tax, and other points of view, depending as much on the nature of
the business and its participants as upon the nature of the form chosen. Why
should a limited partnership be selected? In many cases it obviously should
not. When it is chosen, it is usually for one or more of three reasons: (1) tax
advantages to the participants; 12 (2) limited liability for investors; 3 or (3)
flexibility of organization and management. 14 There are many other factors of
which the attorney and client should be aware when selecting a business
structure, and reliance on the supposed benefits of only these three factors
should not be given without a thorough understanding of others equally
important. One author 5 lists ten factors that must be examined when consid-
ering a limited partnership:
(1) continuity of existence; 16
(2) capital requirements and accessibility; 17
(3) extent of ownership liability for business debis; 8
(4) extent of owner participation in management; 19
(5) transferability of proprietary interest; 20
(6) government control of conduct of business; 21
1I. Several states' business corporation acts provide maximum flexibility of structure in the
corporate form. For example, TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 2.30-I(B) (Supp. 1976-77) provides
for shareholder management, which would allow the corporation to operate much like a
partnership. See Lebowitz, Recent Developments in Texas Corporation Law-Part , 28 Sw. L.J.
641, 692, 716-19 (1974).
12. See discussion at note 24 infra.
13. ULPA § 7 (TULPA § 8).
14. Subject to control problems. See notes 80-138 infra and accompanying text.
15. 2 Z. CAVITCH, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS WITH TAX PLANNING § 39.0212](1967). See also I
id. § 3.02.
16. The term of a limited partnership could be perpetual, considering the transferability
aspects and the use of corporate general partners, but usually the term of a limited partnership is
restricted because of the possible adverse tax consequences. See discussion at note 24 infra.
17. According to 2 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 15, § 39.02[2][b]: "A limited partnership is not the
ideal choice of a business organization for those businessmen who seek large amounts of easily
accessible capital." Nevertheless, the increase in the number of real estate and other syndica-
tions would indicate that the limited partnership form is an effective way for promoters to obtain
investment money for their projects.
18. This factor is one of the advantages of the limited partnership over sole proprietorships
and non-limited partnerships. ULPA § I (TULPA § 2) provides that there must be at least one
partner who is generally liable, and the comments to that section indicate that there is no
substantial policy that requires all investors to be generally liable. See notes 80-138 infra and
accompanying text. Limited liability is not absolute, however, and is not without a corresponding
"disadvantage." It may be lost under several sections of ULPA. See ULPA § 5(2) (TULPA §
6(b)); ULPA § 6 (TULPA § 7); ULPA § 7 (TULPA § 8).
19. The restrictions on limited partner participation in management is the trade-off for
limited liability. ULPA § 7 (TULPA § 8) imposes general liability upon limited partners who take
part in control of the business. "Control" problems are discussed at notes 80-138 infra and
accompanying text.
20. Limited partners are free to assign their interests without causing a dissolution of the
partnership. See ULPA § 19 (TULPA § 20) and notes 186-202 infra and accompanying text. There
are, of course, limitations on the assignee's right to become a limited partner. ULPA §§ 19(4)-(7)(TULPA §§ 20(d)-(g)).
21. "The limited partnership, although entirely a creature of statute, is relatively free from
governmental interference in the conduct of its business." 2 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 15, §
39.02121[f]. Some notable examples of government control exist primarily in the area of securities
regulation. See generally Erwin, Partnership Interests as Securities: An Alice in Wonderland
Tour, 9 CREIGHTON L. REV. 310 (1975). It should be noted that some types of businesses may be.
prohibited from operating as limited partnerships. See note 23 infra.
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(7) complexity and expense of organizing; 22
(8) limitations on the business to be conducted; 23
(9) tax factors ;24
(10) liberality of courts in construing the organic law relating to the form
chosen.25
Only after a complete analysis of the effects of each of these factors in the
limited partnership context should the form be chosen. Several sections
below will indicate the disadvantages of forming a limited partnership with a
mistaken understanding of its advantages.
A. Preliminary Determinations-Prior to Formation
1. Organic considerations are those problems which concern the structure of
the limited partnership rather than internal, day-to-day management. Impor-
tant determinations that should be made include:
22. The only formal requirement is the certificate discussed at notes 62-79 infra and
accompanying text. There may be other formalities required to qualify the partnership to do
business in multi-state transactions. See notes 237-66 infra and accompanying text. As to other
formalities, including the written limited partnership agreement, see notes 56-61 infra and
accompanying text. Generally, special franchise taxes are not applicable to limited partnerships.
2 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 15, § 39.02[2][g].
23. A limited partnership is usually not legally excluded from transacting any specific
businesses, but Texas, in TULPA § 4, excludes banking and insurance, as do most states. In
addition, states sometimes impose limitations on "where" certain businesses may be carried on.
2 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 15. § 39.05[5]. Thus, a limited partnership formed in state A may not be
able to conduct business in state B because of restrictions or requirements in state B. As to
qualification and multi-state problems, see generally notes 139-47, 237-66 infra and accompany-
ing text.
24. This is quite a nebulous area, and the advice of an expert tax attorney should be obtained
before choosing the limited partnership form. Generally, the limited partnership is taxed as a
partnership, with single tax at the partner level, INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 702(a), and
pass-through of deductions to the extent of the partner's basis in his partnership interest, which
basis includes partnership liabilities for which the limited partner may not be liable. Id. § 752;
Treas. Reg. § 1.752-1(e) (1956). See also Rev. Rul. 75-31, 1975-2 CUM. BULL. 10, for reference to
who can be liable for such debts. Special allocations can also be made. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, §
704. But seeTax Reform Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-455, §§ 201-14, 90 Stat. 1520. See especially §
204 which limits deductibility of losses to the aggregate amount of the investment "at risk."
The limited partnership may be taxed as an "association taxable as a corporation" if it
resembles a corporation in too many ways and thus will lose most of its attractiveness. Treas.
Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 (1956), -3(b) (1960). Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2 sets forth four characteristics
which, if a majority are met, will result in taxation as a corporation: (I) No member is personally
liable. This characteristic is avoided by having a general partner: however, a dummy general
partner can create problems. Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(d) (1965). (2) Centralization of manage-
ment. This characteristic exists if substantially all interests are owned by the limited partners.
Treas. Reg. § 301.7701-2(c) (1965). (3) Continuity of life. At one time California permitted partners
to vote to continue the partnership on the death or retirement of a general partner. CAL. CORP.
CODE § 15520(b) (West 1955). The IRS thought that the provision amounted to allowing perpetual
existence, which forced California to amend its version of ULPA. CAL. CORP. CODE § 15520.5
(West Supp. 1976). Rev. Rul. 74-320, 1974-2 CUM. BULl.. 404, noted that California's continuity
of life problem had been corrected by bringing the California ULPA in line with the national act.
See generally Roulac, Resolution of Limited Partnership Disputes: Practical and Procedural
Problems, 10 REAL PROP., PROB. & TR. J. 276, 284 (1975). (4) Free transferability interests. There
should be no problem if there is merely an assignment of a limited partner's share of profits and
not an assignment of right to participate in management. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2(e)(1) (1965),
-3(b)(2) (1960). When considering the limited partnership form, one should always consider the
"safe harbor rules" issued by the IRS. Rev. Proc. 72-13, 1972-1 CUM. BULL. 735.
25. It has been asserted in 2 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 15, § 39.03[2][a) that courts tend to
construe ULPA quite liberally to effect its purposes. While that may be true in many jurisdic-
tions, special note should be taken of decisions by the Texas Supreme Court which tend to restrict
the benefits of limited partnerships. See Park Cities Corp. v. Byrd, 534 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976);
Delaney v. Fidelity Lease, Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975).
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(a) selection of the general partner and whether the general partner will be
an individual or corporation; 26
(b) the name and principal place of business of the proposed limited
partnership;
(c) whether it is going to do business in another state;27
(d) the term of the proposed limited partnership;28
(e) the method of selecting limited partners and the number of limited
partners ;29
(f) the admissibility of limited partners after the formation of the limited
partnership ;30
(g) the transferability of interests of the limited partners; whether the
acquiring party becomes a substituted limited partner; 31
(h) the effect of the death, retirement, insanity, resignation, expulsion, or
bankruptcy of the general partner on the dissolution of the limited
partnership ;32
(i) the extent of the controls the limited partners will have on the actions of
the general partner; 33
(j) the choice of laws that will govern the limited partnership; 34
(k) the right of the surviving spouse of a limited partner to continue with
the limited partnership.
26. This consideration should include the "safe harbor" rules set forth in Rev. Proc. 72-13,
1972-1 CUM. BULL. 735, which states that the IRS will not issue a favorable advance tax ruling
that a partnership with a sole corporate general partner is a "partnership" and not an "associa-
tion taxable as a corporation" for federal income tax purposes unless the rules set out in that Rev.
Proc. are followed. See also Rev. Proc. 74-17, 1974-1 CuM. BULL. 438, for the IRS position on
ruling letters regarding partnerships. Rev. Proc. 74-17 applies whether the general partner is a
corporation or an individual and Rev. Proc. 72-13 applies where there is a sole corporate general
partner. A failure to comply with these safe harbor rules may create problems when the IRS
conducts an audit of the limited partnership, or when there is litigation with the IRS. If a court
finds that a limited partnership is an "association taxable as a corporation," the limited
partnership becomes subject to double taxation, once at the "corporate" level and again on
distribution to the partners, with no pass-through of losses. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-2 (1965), -3(b)
(1960).
27. See notes 237-66 infra and accompanying text.
28. For tax reasons, among others, the term of the partnership cannot be perpetual. See note
24 supra.
29. An interest in a limited partnership may be a security as defined in the Securities Act of
1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-aa (1970) and the Texas Securities Act, TEX. REV. CiV. STAT. ANN. arts.
581-I to -39 (1964 & Supp. 1976-77). Securities Act rule 146, 17 C.F.R. § 230.146 (1976) provides
the basic guidelines for selling securities under the so-called "private offering" exemption,
which may provide some benefit to sellers of limited partnership interests. Article 581-51 of the
Texas Securities Act, supra, allows a private offering exemption under Texas law. Failure to
comply with both of these exemptions provides the purchaser with a right of recission or an action
for damages against both the limited partnership and the promoters. Furthermore, criminal
penalties are provided for violations of both state and federal securities laws. Securities Act of
1933, § 24, 15 U.S.C. § 77x (1970); TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 581-29 (Supp. 1976-77).
30. See ULPA § 25 for requirements as to signatures on amended limited partnership
certificates required when adding limited partners. For this reason the organizers should consider
use of a power of attorney to facilitate execution. See text accompanying notes 221-36 infra.
31. ULPA § 19 (TULPA § 20).
32. ULPA § 20 (TULPA § 21). Consider IRS requirements and tax consequences whenever
dissolution is dealt with unless the business is continued by the remaininggeneral partners under
a right to do so stated in the certificate or with the consent of all members. Determine what other
events will cause the dissolution of the limited partnership-sale of all assets or bankruptcy of the
limited partnership.
33. This factor must be considered carefully because of the strict requirements of ULPA § 7
(TULPA § 8). Under that provision, if "control" by the limited partners is found by a court, the
result will be loss of limited liability. See notes 80-138 infra and accompanying text.
34. See notes 139-47 infra and accompanying text.
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2. Financial considerations concern the initial contributions of partners,
subsequent contributions and assessments, profits and losses, special alloca-
tions, and various financial reports. Financial determinations to be made
include:
(a) the taxable year for the limited partnership; 3"
(b) the method of accounting to be used, whether accrual or cash;
(c) the amount and type of contribution to be made by limited and general
partners ;36
(d) whether additional limited partner contributions will be made;37
(e) the consequences of failure to make additional contributions ;38
(f) whether contributions are to be returned prior to dissolution;39
(g) the frequency and amount of distributions and at whose discretion they
will be made;4°
(h) the allocation of profits and losses, of expenses, and depreciation or
depletion;41
(i) definitions for relevant financial terms; 42
(j) whether the limited partnership will make a basis adjustment on death
of a partner or sale of his interest; 43
(k) the distribution of assets on liquidation;"
(1) the treatment of additional contributions by the general partner,
whether they will be considered loans or capital contributions;
(m) provision for capital accounts, and what will be charged or credited to
such accounts; 45
(n) the general partner's compensation, and whether he is to receive any
guaranteed amounts or income;
(o) the locations of the partnership bank accounts.
35. The taxable year of the partnership must be the same as of its principal partners, or, ifprincipal partners have different taxable years, then the calendar year will be the taxable year.
Treas. Reg. § 1.706-1(b)(l)(ii) (1973).
36. Limited partners may not contribute services. ULPA § 4 (TULPA § 5). If the generalpartner is .contributing services, consider the best method of reducing the exposure to immediate
ordinary income tax. See Treas. Reg. § 1.721-1(b)(1)(1956). Compare Sol Diamond, 56 T.C. 530(1971), aff'd, 492 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1974), with Vestal v. United States, 498 F.2d 487 (8th Cir.
1974). ULPA allows interests to be classified according to the type of property received or other
means. ULPA § 14 (TULPA § 15).
37. See notes 174-85 infra and accompanying text.
38. Id.
39. See ULPA § 16 (TULPA § 17).
40. Two questions involving frequency and amount of distributions are important. First, it
should be determined whether any distributions are to be guaranteed to limited partners.
Secondly, it is important to determine whether distributions will be sufficient to pay the taxes due
because partners in a partnership are taxed on their pro rata share of partnership earnings without
regard to distribution. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, § 704.
41. These items are primarily tax oriented and, thus, careful consideration should be given
whether such allocations meet the "substantial economic effect" test. Id. § 704(b).
42. For example, the limited partnership agreement should define such terms as cash flow,
capital account, profit, loss, income, deduction, affiliation persons, capital contribution, and
sharing ratios.
43. INT. REV. CODE of 1954, 9H 743, 754.
44. The partnership agreement should indicate whether assets will be distributed on the basis
of capital accounts, profit allocation percentage, or some other basis.
45. Determine if partners will be liable to return deficits in their capital accounts to the
partnership when deficits are the result of depreciation and other accounting and tax concepts.
See Park Cities Corp. v. Byrd, 534 S.W.2d 668 (Tex. 1976).
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3. Management considerations include day-to-day management as well as
extraordinary problems. Determinations include:
(a) the extent of the general partner's authority to buy assets for the limited
partnership ;46
(b) the extent of the general partner's authority to borrow on behalf of the
limited partnership, such as his ability to refinance the project without the
consent of the limited partners; 47
(c) the power of the general partner to sell limited partnership assets, to
incur liabilities on behalf of the limited partnership, to execute documents on
behalf of the partnership, to make modifications or repairs to partnership
property, to manage, and to hire employees for the limited partnership;48
(d) the authority of the general partner to deal with affiliated parties or with
himself;
49
(e) the amount of time which the general partner will be required to devote
to the project, and the extent to which he may engage in competing
activities ;50
(f) the authority of the general partner to act without obtaining the specific
consent of the limited partners despite their general consent in the limited
partnership agreement;"
(g) the matters on which the limited partner may vote, if at all; 52
(h) the power of limited partners to remove the general partner;5 3
(i) the formal duties of the general partner, which include obligations to get
out reports, to file the certificate, to file amendments to limited partnership
certificates ;54
(j) the method of accounting and requirements for providing sufficient
data for an audit, including choosing an accountant;
(k) the need for a power of attorney. 55
B. Formal Requirements
The formation of a limited partnership requires more formal documenta-
tion than may be required for a regular partnership. Documents which are
either required or suggested include:
(1) the limited partnership agreement; 56
46. ULPA § 9 (TULPA § 10);'UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9 [hereinafter cited as UPA];
TEXAS UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT § 9, TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art. 6132b, § 9 (1970)
[hereinafter cited as TUPA]. As to the general partners' powers as an agent see notes 203-20 infra
and accompanying text.
47. See notes 196-214 infra and accompanying text.
48. Id.
49. For a discussion of the general partners' fiduciary duties see notes 203-20 infra and
accompanying text.
50. ULPA § 9 (TULPA § 10) allows restrictions on the general partner to be placed in the
certificate.
51. See notes 203-20 infra and accompanying text.
52. For a discussion of control problems see notes 80-138 infra and accompanying text.
53. See note 198 infra and accompanying text.
54. See discussion of control problems at notes 80-143 infra and accompanying text.
55. See discussion of power of attorney at notes 215-30 infra and accompanying text.
56. Several form books provide checklists and forms of agreements. See3 H. KENDRICK & J.
KENDRICK, TEXAS TRANSACTION GUIDE LEGAL FORMS §§ 28-34 (1976); 1 J. RABKIN & M.
JOHNSON, CURRENT LEGAL FORMS WITH TAX ANALYSIS, PARTNERSHIPS-LIMITED PARTNERSHIPS
(1976).
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(2) the certificate of limited partnership;57
(3) a power of attorney for the general partner or a limited partner;5 8
(4) an assumed name certificate ;59
(5) an offering circular;60
(6) consent of spouse. 61
Limited partnerships are somewhat unique in the requirement that a
certificate needs to be filed in order to create the entity with the attributes
sought. Although the certificate is somewhat similar to corporate articles of
incorporation, it contains significant differences. 62 The following discussion
of the certificate will focus primarily on the content of the certificate. In light
of recent controversies regarding the nature and effect of the certificate,
however, it might be helpful to consider what the certificate does and what it
means.
ULPA § 2 provides that the limited partnership is formed when there has
been substantial compliance with the certification requirement; two or more
persons must sign and swear to a certificate containing certain information
specified in ULPA § 2(a) and file the certificate for record in the office of the
secretary of state accompanied by the payment of a filing fee. The fundamen-
tal question at this point is: when is the limited partnership formed? For
example, what if no certificate is filed with the secretary of state? Some
authorities argue that a partnership is formed when the parties agree to
become partners, but that the limited partners do not enjoy the limited liability
shield until the certificate is filed.63 Others argue that a de facto limited
partnership is actually formed.' 4 ULPA § I I provides that a person who has
contributed capital to a business,
erroneously believing that he has become a limited partner ... is not,
by reason of his exercise of the rights of a limited partner, a general
partner with the person or in the partnership carrying on the business, or
bound by the obligations of such person or partnership; provided that on
ascertaining the mistake he promptly renounces his interest in the profits
The major questions arising from the confusion surrounding the legal effect
of the certificate involve multi-state transactions and are more fully discussed
below.65
To be legally effective the certificate must contain at least the following
information:
57. The certificate is required by ULPA § 2 (TULPA § 3). For convenience, it may also
contain the limited partnership agreement although many partnerships may wish to keep the
documents separate because the certificate is typically open to public inspection, See BROMBERG
§ 26(b).
58. For a discussion of power of attorney see notes 221-36 infra and accompanying text.
59. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5924.1 (Supp. 1976-77).
60. Federal or state securities laws may require an offering circular.
61. Certain community property states require this consent.
62, BROMBERG § 26(b).
63, Id. § 26, at 144 n.25.
64, Id. § 32, at 165 n.47. See also ULPA § 2(2) (TULPA § 3(b)): "A limited partnership is
formed if there has been substantial compliance in good faith with the requirements of paragraph
M)."
65. See notes 237-44 infra and accompanying text.
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(1) the partnership name; 66
(2) the character of the business;67
(3) the location of the principal place of business;68
(4) the name and residence of each member, general and limited partners
being designated ;69
(5) the term of the limited partnership; 70
(6) the contribution by each limited partner, specifying the amount of
cash and the agreed value of property contributed by such limited partner;
7 1
(7) the additional contributions (if any) to be made by each limited
partner, and the times at which, or events on the happening of which, they
shall be made;72
(8) the time, if agreed upon, when the contribution of each limited
partner is to be returned;
73
66. U LPA § 2(1)(a)(l) (TULPA § 3(a)(1)(A)). The Texas secretary of state does not regulate
the use of names and, therefore, will neither reserve a name nor permit names which are the same
or deceptively similar to be used. ULPA § 5 (TULPA § 6) provides that a limited partner who
permits his name to be used in the name of the limited partnership shall be liable as a general
partner to creditors who extend credit without actual knowledge that he is not a general partner.
See SECRETARY OF STATE OF TEXAS, FILING GUIDE FOR CORPORATION AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIP
INSTRUMENTS 332 (1976) [hereinafter cited as S/S HANDBOOK]. The common law regulating trade
names or rights to names will be applicable in some cases where businesses of a similar type are
engaged in by two entities. See Assumed Name Statute, TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 5924.1
(Supp. 1976-77).
67. U LPA § 2(1 )(a)(ll) (TU LPA § 3(a)( I )(B)). TULPA § 4 provides that a limited partnership
may carry on any business which can be conducted by a partnership except banking and
insurance. Consider if a limited partnership having a sole corporate general partner can engage in
activities of corporations prohibited by part four of the Texas Miscellaneous Corporation Laws
Act. TEX. REV. Ctv. STAT. ANN. art. 1302-4.01 to .07 (1962).
68. ULPA § 2(l)(a)(lIl) (TULPA § 3(a)(l)(C)). The Texas secretary of state generally
requires that a place of business within Texas be shown.
69. ULPA § 2(l)(a)(IV) (TULPA § 3(a)(I)(D)). The Texas secretary of state requires that a
street address be given for at least one general partner and will accept for filing a limited
partnership certificate containing only the name, city, and state for each limited partner although
the better practice would be to give street addresses for all partners. See S/S HANDBOOK 332.
Persons serving as both general and limited partners should be designated as such.
A foreign corporation serving as a general partner in a Texas limited partnership is considered
to be doing business in Texas, by its own admission, and must obtain a certificate of authority to
do business in Texas pursuant to TEX. Bus. CORP. ACT ANN. art. 8.05 (Supp. 1976-77). A foreign
corporation qualifying to do business in Texas subjects itself to taxation by Texas.
The Texas secretary of state's office issued a statement on November 26, 1974, to the effect
that a foreign corporation limited partner is not deemed to have admitted that it is doing business
in Texas. This policy, however, seems contrary to TEX. Arr'Y GEN. Op. No. WW-191-A (1958)
which takes the position that a foreign corporation serving as a limited partner is doing business in
Texas and must, therefore, qualify.
70. ULPA § 2(l)(a)(V) (TULPA § 3(a)(l)(E)). The Texas secretary of state will not accept a
certificate for filing with a perpetual term.
71. ULPA § 2(l)(a)(VI) (TULPA § 3(a)(l)(F)). ULPA § 4 (TULPA § 5) provides that
contributions by limited partners must be in cash or other property but not services. If property is
contributed, it must be described. Furthermore, showing the aggregate amount of limited
partners' contributions is not sufficient; the individual contributions must be shown. See S/S
HANDBOOK 332-33.
72. ULPA § 2(l)(a)(VII) (TULPA § 3 (a)(I)(G)). According to the Texas secretary of state's
rules, if either the additional contribution is contingent on an event which may not occur or the
amount of such contribution is indefinite and cannot be determined at the time of filing the
certificate, the certificate will be filed only if it contains a statement to the effect that the amount
of such contribution cannot be presently ascertained and that an amendment to the certificate
setting forth the amount of such additional contributions will be filed when such contributions are
made. Secretary of State of Texas Limited Partnership Rules 004.40.00.003(k), S/S HANDBOOK
343-44. See also S/S HANDBOOK 333. While the secretary of state's requirement that a certificate
containing a statement to the effect that an amendment will be filed if uncertainties exist as to
additional contributions may be more than TULPA requires, it is consistent with TULPA § 25
which requires the filing of an amendment to the certificate when a change occurs in the amount
or character of the contribution of any limited partner. ULPA § 24(2)(a) (TULPA § 25(b)(1)).
73. ULPA § 2()(a)(Vil) (TULPA § 3(a)(I)(H)). The meaning of this provision has been
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(9) the share of the profits or other compensation by way of income
which each limited partner shall receive by reason of his contribution;74
(10) the right, if given, of a limited partner to substitute an assignee as
contributor in his place, and the terms and conditions of substitution;75
(11) the right, if given, of the partners to admit additional limited
partners 76
(12) the right, if given, of one or more of the limited partners to priority
over other limited partners, as to contributions or as to compensation by way
of income, and the nature of such priority;
77
(13) the right, if given, of the remaining limited partners to continue the
business on the death, retirement, or insanity of a general partner;
78
(14) the right, if given, of a limited partner to demand and receive property
other than cash in return for his contribution.
79
II. SPECIAL PROBLEMS
When drafting a limited partnership agreement or operating the partnership
itself, it is important to take note of the various problem areas which have
affected the law of limited partnership. There are, at this time, several
difficult areas of which the attorney involved in limited partnership planning
should be aware. These problems include control, conflicts of law and
qualification of foreign limited partnerships, voting and dispute resolution
scarcely explored. The question is, then: What constitutes "the return" of a limited partner's
contribution? ULPA § 15 (TULPA § 16) implies that distributions of income provided for by the
certificate are not a return of a limited partner's contribution, unless after such distribution all of
the partnership assets are in excess of a partnership's liabilities. Similarly, ULPA § 16 (TULPA §
17) provides that no limited partner shall receive a return of any part of his contribution until all
liabilities of the partnership (except to limited partners and general partners) have been paid,
everyone consents, and the certificate is amended. This provision is, of course, subject to the
limited partner's right to demand the return of his contribution under the circumstances set out in
ULPA § 16(2) (TULPA § 17(b)).
Even when a limited partner does receive some returns, he may still have certain legal
obligations. ULPA § 17(2) (TULPA § 18(b)) provides that a limited partner wrongfully receiving
his contribution back from the limited partnership holds the proceeds in trust for the limited
partnership. ULPA § 17(4) (TULPA § 18(d)) provides that even if a limited partner rightfully
receives a return of his contribution, he is liable to the partnership for any sums necessary to
discharge the partnership's liabilities to creditors who existed prior to the date of the return.
Consequently, it would appear that any monies received by a limited partner from the partnership
in excess of the limits imposed by ULPA § 15 (TULPA § 16) will be considered a return of
contribution. That section appears to establish a test based on the balance sheet of the limited
partnership.
74. ULPA § 2(l)(a)(IX) (TULPA § 3(a)(1)(I)). See TULPA § 16. Since profit-sharing
sometimes involves very complicated calculations it appears that the better practice is to set forth
the whole compensation and profit structure in the limited partnership certificate. The Texas
secretary of state only reviews items 1 through 7 and item 9 above in a limited partnership
certificate. S/S HANDBOOK 333.
75. ULPA § 2(l)(a)(X) (TULPA § 3(a)(I)(J)). TULPA § 20 defines and delineates the rights of
a substituted limited partner as contrasted with the rights of an assignee.
76. ULPA § 2(1)(a)(XI) (TULPA § 3(a)(l)(K)). See also ULPA § 8 (TULPA § 9).
77. ULPA § 2(l)(a)(XII) (TULPA § 3(a)(l)(L)). If no priorities are set forth, all limited
partners stand on equal footing. ULPA § 14 (TULPA § 15).
78. ULPA § 2(1)(a)(XIII) (TULPA § 3(a)(1)(M)). See ULPA § 20 (TULPA § 21) which
provides generally that so long as the certificate provides, or all the members consent, the
remaining partners (including at least one general partner) may continue the limited partnership
without dissolution, notwithstanding the death of a general partner.
79. ULPA § 2(I)(a)(XIV) (TULPA § 3(a)( 1 )(N)). ULPA § 16(3) (TULPA § 17(c)) requires that
unless otherwise provided limited partners are entitled to only cash when receiving a return of
contribution.
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mechanisms, assessments, and problems involved in transferring partnership
interests.
A. Control
Section 7 of ULPA provides: "A limited partner shall not become liable as a
general partner unless, in addition to the exercise of his rights and powers as a
limited partner, he takes part in the control of the business. 80 Probably the
most serious problem encountered in drafting and carrying out a limited
partnership agreement is that of determining what constitutes taking part "in
the control of the business" of a limited partnership. The problem is serious
because the penalty for taking part in the control of the business of the limited
partnership is general partner liability. Much of the current literature con-
cerning limited partnership has attempted in some way to treat this difficult
area.8 In addition, some recent cases in attempting to solve the issue have
only made it worse. 82
Neither ULPA nor the official comments define what constitutes taking
part in control of the business. The reason for this is apparent from the legal
framework existing at the time of the drafting of ULPA. The drafters were
confronted with a very difficult problem in that most state courts had strictly
construed existing limited partnership acts as being in derogation of the
common law. The drafters had to find a way to draft around the policy conflict
that primarily gave rise to the reluctance of courts to uphold the limited
liability vehicle. The conflict was between (1) the policy that requires that
creditors and third parties be able to rely on their justifiable expectations of
being repaid when lending money or of having their contracts performed, and
(2) the policy that allows parties to agree to limit their liability to the amount of
their investment.8 3 The drafters attempted to resolve this conflict by requiring
the existence of a partner who has unlimited liability for the obligations of the
partnership and who controls the investments of those who want limited
liability.84 Thus, both the limited partner and the creditor get maximum policy
satisfaction, and rely upon the general partner to assume all of the extraordi-
nary business risks. Yet, even though the drafters were able to create a
business organization acceptable to the courts by successfully reconciling the
two conflicting policies, a third policy, that an investor should have some
supervision over his own investment, was apparently disregarded by the
drafters. Furthermore, in the sixty years since the drafting of ULPA the
policy favoring investor supervision has received a great deal of attention.
The stock market crash of 1929 can be blamed for most of this increased
attention, and the passage of the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities
80. Emphasis added.
81. See, e.g., Augustine, Fass, Lester& Robinson, The Liability of Limited Partners Ha ving
Certain Statutory Voting Rights Affecting the Basic Structure of the Partnership, 31 Bus. LAW.
2087 (1976) [hereinafter cited as Augustine]; Feld, The Control Test for Limited Partnerships, 82
HARV. L. REV. 1471 (1969); Note, Liability of Limited Partners Participating in the Management
of the Sole Corporate General Partner-Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 29 Sw. L.J. 791 (1975).
82. See Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975), notedin 29 Sw. L.J. 791
(1975); Frigidaire Sales Corp. v. Union Properties, Inc., 14 Wash. App. 634,544 P.2d 781 (1975).
83. ULPA § 1, Comment.
84. ULPA § I.
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Exchange Act of 1934 indicates the importance of investor protection
policies. Thus, as a result of the modern emphasis on investor supervision and
the vagueness that surrounds the definition of "control" in ULPA, the
limited partners' investor supervision policy has refused simply to roll over
and play dead.
Cases continue to arise where limited partners interject themselves into the
partnership business to an extent greater than they are allowed explicitly by
ULPA.85 Consequently, the following discussion of control is aimed at aiding
the draftsman and participants in a limited partnership agreement to structure
and operate the partnership with a proper balance of the three underlying
policies of ULPA and to avoid the not so obvious pitfalls in allowing limited
partners greater flexibility in supervising their investments.
1. Attempts To Define Control. Neither ULPA nor the commissioner's notes
provide any definition of the phrase "takes part in the control of the
business." 86 In the absence of a statute, 87 the definition of "taking part in the
85. See, e.g., Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975).
86. Feld, supra note 81, at 1474.
87. A few states have attempted to define control statutorily, or, at least to define certain
types of activity that limited partners can safely engage in without becoming generally liable.
Those statutes are as follows:
(I) ALA. CODE tit. 43, § 27(12)(2) (Cum. Supp. 1973):
A limited partner may from time to time examine into the state and progress of
the partnership business, advise as to its management and act as attorney at law,
but he must not act as agent for the partnership for any purpose; and if he acts
contrary to this provision he is liable as a general partner to any partnership
creditor who extends credit to the partnership in the good faith belief that he is
dealing with a general partner.
Emphasis in this statute is clearly on reliance by third parties. The statute's failure to specifically
enumerate permissible powers leaves unanswered the question of whether the limited partner can
exercise unlimited control and retain his limited liability so long as there is no reliance by third
parties. Also, based upon the California experience, Alabama may have adopted a provision
which renders Alabama a state whose limited partnership law does not conform to ULPA, thus
endangering the status of Alabama limited partnerships as partnerships for federal income tax
purposes.
(2) CAL. CORP. CODE § 15507(b) (West Supp. 1976) provides:
A limited partner shall not be deemed to take part in the control of the business
by virtue of his possessing or exercising a power, specified in the certificate, to
vote upon matters affecting the basic structure of the partnership, including the
following matters or others of a similar nature:
(1) Election or removal of general partners.
(11) Termination of the partnership.
(III) Amendment of the partnership agreement.
(IV) Sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the partnership.
Complementing § 15507(b), 10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE rule 260.140.116.2, 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
8626 (1975), applicable only to real estate limited partnerships, provides in part that:
[t]o the extent the law of the state in question is not inconsistent, the limited
partnership agreement must provide that a majority of the then outstanding
limited partnership interests may, without the necessity of concurrence by the
generalpartner, vote to (I) amend the limited partnership agreement, (2) dissolve
the program, (3) remove the general partner and elect a new general partner, and
(4) approve or disapprove the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the
program. (Emphasis added.)
Two particular problems are raised by this last rule. First, does the introductory phrase mean
that rule 260.140.116.2 is applicable if the law of any state which is applicable to the partnership
does not expressly prohibit these powers beinggiven to the limited partners? If rule 260.140.116.2
does require the above mentioned powers to be included in the partnership agreement unless
expressly prohibited by the law of the state of formation, the exercise of these powers could very
likely result in loss of limited liability in the master state. Rule 260.140.128.2, 1 CCH BLUE SKY L.
REP. 8627 (1975), which is the comparable provision for oil and gas limited partnerships,
somewhat modified this question by providing, "[t]o the extent the law of the state of organiza-
tion is not inconsistent .... "
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control of business" is left to state courts, although in many states this
remains a question of first impression. The few cases decided have been
analyzed by commentators who have attempted to bring them together on a
consistent basis. From their studies the commentators have discerned two
tests: the "power test ' 88 and the "reliance by third parties test." 8 9
The basis of the power test is quite formalistic and places too great an
emphasis upon the organic structure of the limited partnership. Thus, if the
limited partners have powers which include the right to initiate matters and to
decide them entirely within the group of limited partners, such powers may
constitute substantial control in the limited partners and the resulting loss of
limited liability. 9 While mere potential to exert control is quite significant to a
determination whether the limited partnership entity qualifies for partnership
or association tax status, many authorities believe that potential control is not
sufficient under ULPA § 7 which, at least literally, requires actualcontrol. In
fact, to date no case has ever held that ULPA § 7 was violated merely by
possession of unexercised power to control. 9' For these reasons the trend of
the law is toward a "reliance by third parties" 92 test which is defined as
follows: "If the activities of the limited partner would induce reasonable
reliance by third parties upon the apparent general liability of the limited
partner, that partner will not have limited liability."9'
The difficulty with the application of either of these tests is that neither can
be applied across the broad range of control problems. Because the control
problem is not wholly structural to the extent that an ULPA § 7 problem that is
non-structural exists, the power test is inapplicable because the control
problem is not wholly structural in nature. Similarly, the reliance test, while
more practical overall, is unworkable when creditor reliance is not the key § 7
difficulty. 94 A better approach to the problem of defining control violations
The second problem is that by not requiring the concurrence of the general partner(s), the rule
would seem to bring the exercise of these powers within the "power test" discussed supra,
because the ability of the limited partners, as a group, to initiate matters and decide them entirely
within the group, may constitute control sufficient to cause loss of limited liability under ULPA §
7. In addition to those powers enumerated in rule 260.140.116.2, rule 260.140.128.2 requires that
the limited partners be given the power to "cancel any contract for services with the sponsor or
any affiliate without penalty upon thirty days notice." Again, application of the "power test" to
this rule could result in loss of limited liability.
(3) DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 1707 (1974).
(4) NEV. REV. STAT. § 88.080 (1973).
(5) ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 69.280(2)(a)-(d) (1975).
(6) WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 25.08.070(2) (Supp. 1975).
See also notes 149-63 infra and accompanying text regarding partnership democracy; Augus-
tine, supra note 8 1. The authors indicate that exercise of statutory voting rights allowed by these
states should not affect the limited liability of partners who vote, either within the state allowing
the voting right or under the laws of states which do not. Id. at 2106-07.
88. See Comment, Foreign Limited Partnerships: A Proposed Amendment to the Uniform
Limited Partnership Act, 47 So. CAL. L. REV. 1174, 1193 (1974).
89. See, e.g., Feld, supra note 81.
90. Roulac, supra note 24, at 283-85. See Plasteel Prods. Corp. v. Helman, 271 F.2d 354 (1 st
Cir. 1959); Rathke v. Griffith, 36 Wash. 2d 394, 218 P.2d 757 (1950); BROMBERG § 26; Augustine,
supra note 81, at 2101.
91. Brodsky, Corporate and Securities Litigation-Tax Shelter Litigation: Participating in
Control of the Partnership, 176 N.Y.L.J., Sept. 15, 1976, at 1, col. I.
92. See Delaney v. Fidelity Lease Ltd., 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975).
93. Note, Partnership: Can Rights Required to be Given Limited Partners under New Tax
Shelter In vestment Regulations be Reconciled with Section 7 of the Uniform Limited Partnership
Act?, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 289, 293 (1973).
94. One problem with the reliance test which has never been pointed out is that it tends to
protect only those creditors involved in the case under consideration, without expressing concern
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may be found in a policy analysis of various "control" situations, using those
policies enumerated above.9 5
2. Policy Analysis of Control. There are four distinct fact patterns which
have given rise to control problems: (1) the third party reliance situation; (2)
the inadequate general partner situation; (3) the powerful limited partner
situation; and (4) the limited partner takeover situation. Each situation
involves facts that affect the three policies underlying ULPA in very different
ways. The failure of courts and commentators to deal adequately with this
fact-policy relationship has been a major stumbling block to planning around
control problems.
The Third Party Reliance Situation. As noted above, reliance cases have
received the greatest attention by the courts.' This situation involves a
limited partner whose acts might cause a third party or a creditor to rely upon
the limited partner's credit as if he were a general partner. Cases are plentiful
in which the limited partner's acts inducing reliance were an issue. For
example, in J.C. Wattenbarger & Sons v. Sanders97 the limited partner acted
as personal guarantor of a loan to the limited partnership.9 In Gast v.
Petsinger 9 two limited partners were advertised to be "project managers" of
the limited partnership property. The limited partner in Silvola v. Rowlett'0°
acted as a foreman employed by the partnership and was allowed to purchase
parts as necessary, but had no power to extend credit without approval from
the general partner.' Finally, in Fisk v. Moczik12 the limited partner sold
trees to a third party from land owned by the partnership. 103 In reliance cases
the policy most strongly affected is, of course, the policy of protecting third
parties and creditors. Most courts which find "control" in third party reliance
situations can find no reason to approve the limited liability of persons who
actively induce others to rely. 1°4
The Inadequate General Partner Situation. As noted above, 10 5 the policies
underlying ULPA require the presence of a generally liable general partner to
accommodate the conflict between creditor protection and freedom to agree
to limit liability. Thus, when the general partner is "inadequate," either
for any effect on the policy of the law to protect creditors generally. A hint of this objection is
present in Delaney where, although there was no creditor or third party reliance in the case itself,
the structure of the partnership could possibly have impaired the overall policy of creditor
protection. The court's swift and impolitic dismissal of third party reliance, however, has been
read, not without justification, as a complete removal of all third party and creditor concerns
from the "control" definition. See Note, supra note 81.
95. See discussion accompanying notes 88-94 supra.
96. See notes 92-93 supra and accompanying text.
97. 191 Cal. App. 2d 857, 13 Cal. Rptr. 92 (1961).
98. The court held that the question of fact as to whether the defendant held himself out as a
general partner precluded summary judgment. 13 Cal. Rptr. at 96.
99. 228 Pa. Super. 394, 323 A.2d 371 (1974).
100. 129 Colo. 522, 272 P.2d 287 (1954).
101. The court held that the limited partner had not induced reliance by third parties, hence,
had not taken control. 272 P.2d at 290.
102. 329 So. 2d 35 (Fla. App. 1976).
103. The limited partner was held liable for removing the trees and selling them without
authority, but no mention was made of "control." Id. at 37.
104. Feld, supra note 81, at 1479.
105. See notes 84-85 supra and accompanying text.
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financially or managerially, the policy accommodation is disturbed and
control problems arise. This particular situation has received a great amount
of attention in the past few years and an equal amount of misunderstanding.
Fact situations can range from the blatant "straw man" general partner to the
more subtle and serious problems involved with a corporate general
partner. 106
Four prominent cases, including one from Texas, have considered this
problem. In Weil v. Diversified Properties°7 a situation arose in which the
limited partners began to manage the business through a manager while the
general partner removed himself from the scene.° 8 Unfortunately, the court
expressed no opinion as to the effect of allowing a non-partner manager to
carry on in the place of the general partner and at the request of the limited
partners." ° The three other cases all involved limited partnerships having a
corporate general partner. In Evans v. ElDorado Improvement Co."O the two
limited partners had set up a corporation, of which they were the sole owners,
to be the general partner of the partnership. The court refused to allow limited
liability because the obvious "straw man" gimmick would have been inequi-
table to the third party judgment creditor."' In Delaney v. Fidelity Lease
Ltd. "2 the general partner was a corporation. There were twenty-two limited
partners, three of whom were also the shareholders, officers, and directors of
the corporate general partner. The Texas Supreme Court, in a widely
criticized decision," 13 held that the three shareholder, officer, and director
limited partners could be generally liable if they had exercised control over
the general partner. The Texas court improvidently stated that reliance was
not required to give rise to control.14On what were for all practical purposes
the exact same facts, a Washington court of appeals, in Frigidaire Sales Corp.
v. Union Properties, Inc.," 5 held that shareholder, officer, and director
limited partners were not liable without creditor reliance. A further compari-
son, however, shows the two cases to be more in accord than their divergent
holdings would indicate." 6 Notwithstanding Delaney's statements regarding
reliance, the Texas Supreme Court indicated quite strongly that its primary
concern was the danger that the situation would impair the policy of creditor
protection. The court stated:
In no event should they [the three limited partners] be permitted to
escape the statutory liability which would have devolved upon them if
there had been no attempted interposition of the corporate shield against
106. See Comment, The Limited Partnership with a Corporate General Partner-Federal
Taxation-Partnership or Association , 24 Sw. L.J. 285 (1970).
107. 319 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1970).
108. Id. at 780.
109. The case was decided on the rather narrow point whether a general partner could invoke
§ 7 against the limited partners.
110. 46 Cal. App. 3d 84, 119 Cal. Rptr. 889 (1975).
11I. 119 Cal. Rptr. at 892. No reference to "control" was made in deciding the case, which
can be read as a typical "piercing the corporate veil" case as well as a limited partnership liability
case.
112. 526 S.W.2d 543 (Tex. 1975), noted in 29 Sw. L.J. 791 (1975).
113. See, e.g., Augustine, supra note 81, at 2104 n.56; Note, supra note 81.
114. 526 S.W.2d at 545.
115. 14 Wash. App. 634, 544 P.2d 781 (1975).
116. See Brodsky, supra note 91, at 2.
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personal liability. Otherwise, the statutory requirement of at least one
general partner with general liability in a limited partnership can be
circumvented or vitiated by limited partners operating the partnership
through a corporation with minimum capitalization and therefore
minimum liability.117
Thus, from a policy viewpoint the Texas court might have decided correctly if
it were not for the fact that the case contained no facts to indicate that the
corporate general partner was minimally capitalized or that there was intent to
disturb a creditor's rights. The Delaney decision results, therefore, in an
impairment of the policies of allowing the parties to have limited liability and
investor supervision, but does not significantly promote the policy of creditor
protection."18 The holding in Frigidaire is better reasoned. In that case the
court indicated that the primary inquiry would be whether the corporation
was formed for a valid business purpose, whether it was adequately
capitalized, and whether it treated third parties as a corporate entity. 119Thus,
the Frigidaire case promotes creditor protection without impairing investor
supervision or limited liability.
The Powerful Limited Partner Situation. This situation differs from the
reliance situation noted above in that it is more of a structural or organiza-
tional problem than purely an activities related problem. Nevertheless, it
upsets the ULPA policy balance between creditor protection and limited
liability in much the same way as the inadequate general partner. 20 One
situation in particular typifies this problem area: limited partner voting rights.
Partnership democracy is of concern in most limited partnerships.' 2 ' In
several states the principle is statutorily allowed, and in some it is required. In
either situation, however, partnership democracy is often included in partner-
ship agreements without consideration of whether it will create control
problems. One author who has considered the problem analyzes the control
effects by considering the third party reliance effects.'22 Another considers
the problem in terms of structural effects.'23
The problem is best analyzed by examining the nature of the subjects upon
which limited partners may vote because the extent of these voting rights has
an important bearing upon whether their exercise will constitute control. In
most cases, voting rights are allowed only for the most extraordinary mat-
ters, ' 2 4 and they generally do not exist as to day-to-day matters. Even in
extraordinary matters, however, limited partner voting rights may seriously
impair the creditor protection policy. As one author states:
An overall reading of the ULPA and a consideration of the policies
behind it make it apparent that the forbidden participation in the control
of the partnership business which is contemplated by section 7 of the
ULPA is a taking part in the day-to-day business of the partnership, as
117. 526 S.W.2d at 546.
118. See note 83 supra.
119. 544 P.2d at 784-85.
120. See notes 105-19 supra and accompanying text.
121. See notes 149-54 infra and accompanying text.
122. Augustine, supra note 81, at 2101.
123. BROMBERG § 26, at 147-48 n.37.
124. See notes 154, 155 infra and accompanying text; Augustine, supra note 81, at 2101.
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opposed to the ability to influence the partnership's basic structure
which the statutory voting rights provide. Arguably, this is why section 7,
in effect, forbids a 'tak[ing] part in the control of the business of the
partnership,' rather than an ability to influence management or the
partnership's basic structure. A careful examination of the ULPA and
the policies behind it lend additional support to this conclusion.
The right to vote to remove the general partner, of all the statutory
voting rights specifically permitted by statute . . .would appear to
provide limited partners with the most direct means of influencing the
course of the partnership's business and, for this reason, makes the
strongest argument for the imposition of general liability. However,
although the ULPA contains no direct reference to the possibility of
limited partners voting to remove or to elect a general partner, the right is
one which would seem to be entirely consistent with the policies behind
the ULPA and, arguably, is implicit within it.1
25
Gast v. Petsinger 26 is one of the few cases which have dealt with the voting
rights of limited partners. In Gast the limited partnership agreement granted
the limited partners certain rights to attend meetings to vote on acts "outside
the ordinary business of the partnership. "' 27 Although the limited partners
attended meetings and received reports, the court held that they did not take
part in the control of the business. Similarly, in Plasteel Products Corp. v.
Helman ' 8 trustee limited partners who exercised the power to select a general
sales manager had not taken part in control.
It is the consensus of most authors that exercising voting rights as to
extraordinary matters should not constitute control. This conclusion is sound
when analyzed from a policy viewpoint. The policy of investor supervision is
most strongly promoted by allowing voting rights' 29 because no investor
desires to place his investment totally beyond his reach. Although the policy
of creditor protection may be impaired to some degree if voting rights are
extensive, when limited to certain conditions and certain matters, the
optimum policy satisfaction would be achieved by yielding a small amount of
creditor protection so as to allow a reasonable degree of investment supervi-
sion. Otherwise, the ability to achieve limited liability will be restricted by
forcing businessmen to choose other business structures.
The Limited Partner Takeover Situation. This situation occurs invariably in
the crises surrounding partnerships that are in financial difficulty. 3 ° The
limited partner takeover presents the same policy clashes found in both the
reliance situation and the powerful limited partner situation, although in a
more intense fashion. Limited partners in this situation are typically in such a
panic to salvage their investments that they act without considering either
their own limited liability or the reliance of third parties at a time when their
limited liability status is most threatened and creditors are most insecure.
Crisis takeover problems are apparent in several cases. In Weil v. Diver-
125. Augustine, supra note 81, at 2101.
126. 228 Pa. Super. 394, 323 A.2d 371 (1974).
127. 323 A.2d at 372.
128. 271 F.2d 354 (Ist Cir. 1959).
129. See, e.g., BROMBERG § 26, at 147-48 n.37; Augustine, supra note 81, at 2106-07; Roulac,
supra note 24, at 283.
130. For a good discussion of the problems that may arise in limited partnerships with
financial difficulties, and how to plan for unfavorable contingencies, see Roulac, supra note 24.
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sified Properties31 the limited partners met, selected managers, and continued
the business without the general partner. No "control" was found because
the case was decided on the issue of whether the ousted general partner could
invoke ULPA § 7 against the limited partners.' The court did imply,
however, that, if the action had been brought by a creditor, the limited
partners would have been held liable.' 33 In Trans-Am Builders, Inc. v. Woods
Mill, Ltd.134 the limited partners were more cautious. One limited partner
visited the project site and berated the construction superintendent, but the
court held that merely having meetings and taking part in discussions about
the problem was not enough to cause the limited partners to lose limited
liability. Deciding that the limited partners' acts did not constitute control, the
court quoted Weil:
Certainly common sense dictates that in times of severe financial crisis
all partners in such an enterprise, limited or general, will become actively
interested in any effort to keep the enterprise afloat and many abnormal
problems will arise that are not under any stretch of the imagination mere
day-to-day matters of managing the partnership business. This is all that
occurred in this instance. 1
35
Something else that "occurred in this instance" was that neither court
considered the complex creditor reliance problems which exist when the
partnership flounders. The court in Weil did not have to, 3 6 and Trans-Am's
facts indicate no abnormal creditor problem.' Nevertheless, limited part-
ners in the crisis situation are more inclined to disturb the expectations of
creditors than at any other time.
The problem of the financially distressed partnership cannot be eliminated.
Through advance planning, however, limited partners can reduce the possi-
bility of control problems should they find it necessary to salvage their
interests from a sinking partnership. An adequate voting and general partner
replacement provision in the agreement would outline the proper procedures
limited partners should take in substituting new management,' 38 and prevent
the limited partner takeover that usually occurs.
3. Control in Multi-State Transactions. The problem of control is difficult
enough when it is limited to a single jurisdiction. It becomes even more
difficult when the limited partnership begins to cross state lines. Perhaps the
most troubling aspect of the multi-state control problem is that neither the
concept of control nor the jurisprudence of conflict of laws has become
settled enough to allow any reasonable degree of predictability. Thus, a good
131. 319 F. Supp. 778 (D.D.C. 1970); see note 107 supra.
132. 319 F. Supp. at 781-84.
133. Id. at 783.
Since the partnership agreement was not violated by the limited partners, Weil
has no cause of action and his request for the appointment of a receiver and an
accounting will be denied. The provisions of the Limited Partnership Act are
primarily designed to protect creditors. So long as the provisions of the agreement
were followed, no partner can complain. Weil's complaint is dismissed.
Id. (emphasis added).
134. 133 Ga. App. 411, 210 S.E.2d 866 (1974).
135. 210 S.E.2d at 868, quoting 319 F. Supp. at 782.
136. See note 133 supra.
137. The basis of the control argument in Trans Am was merely that the limited partners had
met and discussed the matter with the general partner. 210 S.E.2d at 869.
138. See notes 149-69 infra and accompanying text.
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deal of guesswork must be used in planning around control problems in
multi-state transactions. The discussion contained in this section of the
Article is intended to raise the problems involved in planning around such
situations. Choice of law determinations are complicated processes, how-
ever, and this Article will not deal with them in any great depth. Nevertheless,
three basic questions must be answered before making any choice of law
planning determination.
First, the theory of conflict of laws in any particular state must be
ascertained. There are a variety of methods which are usually described as
being either traditional analysis methods" or functional analysis methods.140
Second, in dealing with either method of conflict resolution a process of
characterization must be accomplished. In the traditional method of analysis
facts are characterized into traditional legal categories.' 4' In functional
analysis the characterization involved is a much more subtle articulation of
the policies underlying the laws being applied. Thus, it must be recognized,
contrary to the expectations of the advocates of functional analysis, that,
similar to the traditional method, the functional analysis system is subject to
manipulation by judges seeking to justify a particular result rather than honor
a particular method. Finally, a choice of law should be made from use of the
particular method invoked.
Very few reported cases have dealt with conflict of laws problems in the
limited partnership context. The few decided cases are limited to the tradi-
tional method of analysis. 142 To date there have been no reported decisions
using the interest analysis approach.143 Since about half of the states now have
adopted interest analysis, 144 and Texas also has expressed some tendency to
adopt the method, 145 there appears to be little guidance from a planning
viewpoint. Some generalizations are evident, however, and in matters involv-
ing disputes solely between partners the laws of the state of formation have
been preferred.146 Where creditors have been harmed the results have been
139. Traditional methods of analyzing conflicts questions were adopted in the RESTATEMENT
(FIRsT) OF CONFLICTS OF LAW (1934). The workings of the traditional system are described as a
function of "categories of type situations" and designated "connecting factors." The categori-
zation of type situations is called "characterization," and usually involves labeling a fact
situation as one involving problems of contract, tort, real property, and others. The "connecting
factor" refers to the link between a person or transaction and a given state. The connecting factor
may be, for example, a place of contracting, domicile, or place of injury. Augustine, supra note
81, at 2090 n.7, citing A. SHAPIRA, THE INTEREST APPROACH TO CHOICE OF LAW 11 (1970).
Characterization is the most difficult aspect of the traditional method.
140. Functional analysis is also known as "interest analysis." It was developed in a well-
known article by Professor Brainerd Currie, Married Women's Contracts: A Study in Conflict-of-
Laws Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958). Functional analysis attempts to avoid the anomalies
that often result in use of the traditional methods by focusing directly upon the policies
underlying the laws of the jurisdictions in conflict. Often a policy analysis indicates there is no
conflict of laws at all, in which case, the law of the only "interested" jurisdiction will be applied.
Such situations are referred to as "false conflicts." "True conflicts" exist when both states
involved are interested in the transaction. At this time, no satisfactory method has evolved for
dealing with true conflicts. See generally D. CAVERS, THE CHOICE OF LAW PROCESS (1965); A. VON
MEHREN & D. TRAUTMAN, THE LAW OF MULTISTATE PROBLEMS (1965).
141. See note 139 supra.
142. See, e.g., Gilman Paint & Varnish Co. v. Legum, 197 Md. 665, 80 A.2d 906 (1951);
Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 286 (1953); King v. Sarria, 69 N.Y. 24, 25 Am. R. 128 (1877).
143. Augustine, supra note 81, at 2096.
144. See R. WEINTRAUB, COMMENTARY ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 234-38 (1971).
145. See Marmon v. Mustang Aviation Co., 430 S.W.2d 182 (Tex. 1968).
146. See, e.g., Gilman Paint & Varnish Co. v. Legum, 197 Md. 665, 80 A.2d 906 (1951);
Annot., 29 A.L.R.2d 286 (1953).
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less consistent. 147
RULPA has attempted to deal with the multi-state problem by including the
following choice of law provision:
Subject to the Constitution and public policy of this state, the laws of
the state under which a foreign limited partnership is organized govern its
limited partners, and a foreign limited partnership may not be denied
registration by reason of any difference between those laws and the laws
of this state. 1
48
B. Voting and Dispute Resolution
Partnership democracy is the concept which allows limited partners a vote
regarding certain actions taken by general partners.'49 The basis for partner-
ship democracy is found in the policy reasons noted above favoring invest-
ment control' ° because in a partnership democracy situation the limited
partner is better able to supervise his investment when given a vote regarding
extraordinary matters. At the same time, the power of a general partner to act
arbitrarily or capriciously with the investment money of limited partners is
reduced.
Some states' limited partnership acts allow partnership democracy provi-
sions in limited partnership agreements.'5 I Most of these statutes, however,
do not make voting provisions mandatory.' 52 The blue sky laws of several
states and policies of various securities associations also allow and often
require limited partners' voting rights.'53
If a partnership voting provision is to be included in the partnership
agreement, the mechanics of the provision should be clearly spelled out. The
provision for partnership democracy in the agreement should set forth in
detail the procedures to be implemented in arranging for partnership democ-
racy. The agreement should also provide for voting without meetings by use
of written unanimous consents. The following matters should especially be
considered and included in the agreement:
I. Matters Subject to Vote of the Partners. Before granting voting powers, a
drafter should determine whether a proposed voting power is already the
limited partner's "right" under ULPA, and whether the power will raise con-
trol problems.' 54 Matters for which limited partners are commonly granted
the right to vote include: (i) election or removal of the general partner; (2)
termination of the partnership; (3) amendment of the partnership agreement;
(4) sale of all or substantially all of the partnership's assets; and (5) other
147. See 2 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 15, § 28.03 (1963).
148. RULPA, supra note 10, § 901.
149. Roulac, supra note 24, at 297.
150. See policy discussion accompanying notes 80-85 supra.
151. See statutes cited and discussed in note 87 supra.
152. Augustine, supra note 81, at 2088.
153. See, e.g., CAL. ADMIN. CODE rule 260.140.116.2, I CCH BLUESKY L. REP. 8626(1975);
Midwest Sec. Comm'rs Ass'n Statement of Policy § VII(B), I CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 4821(1975); Texas Administrative Guidelines for the Registration of Real Estate Programs rule G(2)[065.09.00.007], 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 46,609, at 42,526 (1976).
154. See notes 80-138 supra and accompanying text; Augustine, supra note 81.
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matters generally outside the normal course of management, such as, chang-
ing the nature of the business, or incurring excessive indebtedness.' 55
2. Who May Call the Meetings?The general partner should always have the
right to call a meeting of the partnership, but the right should not be
exclusively his, especially in a large partnership. For this reason, limited
partner interests constituting a certain percentage such as ten percent or
twenty percent, or a minimum amount of the total capital investment, should
also be given the right.
3. Notice. The notice provision should specify the form and manner of
notice. The notice itself should specify the subject matter of a proposed
action by the partnership. In this context it may be important to consider
whether the partners may discuss and vote on matters not described in the
notice. Moreover, the general partner or the limited partner qualified to call
the meeting should be required to send notice. The notice provision should
provide adequate lead time for a meeting and should allow the use of regularly
kept partnership records for the source of information as to whom and where
notice should be sent. The location of the meeting should also be set out in the
partnership agreement, subject to change. Any change in the location should
be specified in the notice.
4. Quorum. The partnership agreement should provide a reasonable quorum
requirement depending on the size of the partnership. The agreement should
also state whether the quorum is based on a head count or a percentage of
ownership interests.
5. Voting Rights. The agreement should specify the vote required for the
adoption of any proposal although usually a majority of the ownership
interests is required. 156 The agreement should also specify whether votes are
to be based on percentage interest, amount invested, or on a per capita basis.
In a complex organization it may even be necessary to classify the partners,
much like corporate shareholders, and require a majority of each class, such
as fifty percent of general partnership interests, fifty percent of each class of
limited partnership interest. It may also be necessary to specify whether the
vote required is to be a majority of all interests or of only those present and
voting. It is important that the agreement be in accord with statutory provi-
sions specifying voting requirements. 157
Certain situations may alter the voting right temporarily. For example,
partnership voting may involve actions in which the general partner or a
limited partner is personally interested, and the voting requirements may be
155. See, e.g., statutes cited at note 87 supra.
156. Midwest Sec. Comm'rs Ass'n Statement of Policy § VII(B), I CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
4821 (1975) provides in part:
B. Voting Rights of Limited Partners.
To the extent the law of the state in question is not inconsistent, the limited
partnership agreement must provide that a majority of the then outstanding
limited partnership interests may, without the necessity for concurrence by the
general partner, vote to (1) amend the limited partnership agreement, (2)dissolve
the program, (3) remove the general partner and elect a new general partner, and
(4) approve or disapprove the sale of all or substantially all of the assets of the
program.
157. See statutes cited at note 87 supra.
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varied to adjust to this situation. " The agreement should also specify the use
of proxies, subject to the proxy rules of the state and federal securities
laws. 159 Finally, limited partnerships which are comprised of other business
entities may require special consideration in the partnership agreement.
160
Some states have enacted statutes exempting limited partners who vote on
certain matters from the drastic effects of ULPA § 7. These statutes have
provided that control will not be affected by complying with the statutes. 161 In
other states, including Texas, partnership democracy may create potential
control problems even though state blue sky requirements, together with the
extraordinary nature of the problems subject to partnership vote, suggest that
giving the limited partners a vote does not constitute control within the
meaning of ULPA § 7.162 Still, the control problem is magnified when involved
in a multi-state transaction in which one state allows partnership voting
specifically and the other state is silent on the matter.163
In a move that may relieve much of the problem concerning control in the
voting situation, the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform
State Laws has proposed the following revisions:
Section 302 [Voting.] Subject to the provisions of Section 303, the
partnership agreement may grant to all or a specified group of the limited
partners the right to vote (on a per capita or any other basis) upon any
matter. 164
Section 303(b). A limited partner does not participate in the control of the
business within the meaning of subsection (a) solely by:
(1) voting on one or more of the following matters:
(a) the dissolution and winding up of the limited partnership;
(b) the sale, exchange, lease, mortgage, or other transfer of all or
substantially all of the assets of the limited partnership other than
in the ordinary course of its business;
158. Cf. discussion of general partner's fiduciary duties, at notes 207-20 infra.
159. SeeSecurities Exchange Act of 1934, § 14, 15 U.S.C. § 78n (1970), and rules thereunder.
At least one commentator has suggested that the proxy rules may have an increasing role in the
limited partnership context.
Proxy requirements and even guidelines governing tender offers are not alien to
the limited partnership context. While efforts to replace the general partner are
most frequently associated with partnerships in financial trouble, there have been
several recent instances of a general partner's interests being taken over in
partnerships whose performance, if not outstanding, at least was competitive-
with the limited partners receiving a reasonable return on their investment. The
mechanics for conducting a takeover bid in the corporate securities area are
complex and subject to very specific regulation. Although the same general
principles would seem to apply to the partnership area as well, there are no
specific guidelines to suggest how such a contest might be handled in the
partnership context.
Roulac, supra note 24, at 303.
160. Id.
161. See statutes cited at note 87 supra.
162. BROMBERG § 26, at 147-48 n.37.
163. See Augustine, supra note 81.
164. RULPA, supra note 10, § 302. The comment to this proposed section states:
Section 302 is new, and must be read together with subdivision (b)(5) of Section
303. Although the prior uniform law did not speak specifically of the voting
powers of limited partners, it is not uncommon for partnership agreements to
grant such power to limited partners. Section 302 is designed only to make it clear
that the partnership agreement may grant such power to limited partners. If such
powers are granted to limited partners beyond the safe harbor of Section
303(b)(5), a court may hold that the limited partners have participated in 'control
of the business' within the meaning of Section 303(a).
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(c) the incurrence of indebtedness by the limited partnership other
than in the ordinary course of its business;
(d) a change in the nature of the business; or
(e) the removal of a general partner. 6
Voting is not the only method for resolving disputes in a limited partner-
ship. For example, an arbitration clause may be desirable." 6 It is very
important, however, to exercise caution in drafting such a clause. The
draftsman should either name an arbitrator or set forth a means of choosing an
arbitrator who will act fairly. Limited partners should not rely upon the
general partner's discretion in this matter, especially since the provision will
be employed only in the most serious disputes. Ground rules that will be fair
to each side should also be agreed upon, although requiring compliance with
the American Arbitration Association rules would probably be sufficient. 167 It
should be noted that arbitration is subject to statutory control in various
states. For example, the Texas General Arbitration Act"6 provides that
arbitration agreements are valid and enforceable if entered into under certain
strict conditions. 169
Another appropriate dispute resolution mechanism might be provision of a
lawyer to represent the limited partners' interests. 17 0 In many instances the
general partner's attorney is the only attorney involved in drafting the limited
partnership agreement. A clarification of the responsibilities of that lawyer
and who he actually represents is often required. One author recommends
that the limited partners retain counsel or have the generial partner retain
counsel for the limited partners to represent their interests both in drafting the
agreement and in subsequent disputes with the general partner.' 7 ' Other
dispute resolution mechanisms include buy-out arrangements, with special
provisions for funding them,'72 and a "conflict insurance fund" which would
cover the cost of retaining independent economic and legal representatives in
case of a dispute between general and limited partners.1 7 3
C. Assessments
Except to the extent provided in the certificate of limited partnership or in
the event of loss of limited liability, a limited partner's interest in the
partnership is not assessable. 17 4 The limited partner will lose to creditors only
165. RULPA, supra note 10, § 303.
166. See, e.g., Pacific Inv. Co. v. Townsend, 58 Cal. App. 3d 1, 129 Cal. Rptr. 489 (1976)
(discussion of arbitration clause in a limited partnership). See also Roulac, supra note 24, at 308.
167. See, e.g., 2 AM. JUR. LEGAL FORMS 2d Arbitration and Award § 23:41 (1971).
168. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 224 to 238-6 (1973).
169. Id. art. 224 states in part:
A written agreement concluded upon the advice of counsel to both parties as
evidenced by counsels' signatures thereto to submit any existing controversy to
arbitration or a provision in a written contract concluded upon the advice of
counsel to both parties as evidenced by counsels' signatures thereto to submit to
arbitration any controversy thereafter arising between the parties is valid,
enforceable and irrevocable, save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity
for the revocation of any contract.
170. Roulac, supra note 24, at 308.
171. Id.
172. Massman, Buy-Sell Arrangements, in CORPORATION, BANKING AND BUSINESS LAW
SECTION, STATE BAR of TEXAS, TEXAS PARTNERSHIP LAW at El (1976).
173. Roulac, supra note 24, at 308.
174. ULPA § 17(1) (TULPA § 18(a)).
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the amount of his capital contribution, even if rightfully returned to him,' 75
and the partnership assets. For this reason, under ULPA § 2(l)(a)(VII) the
certificate is required to state what additional contributions, if any, shall be
made by each limited partner, at either a specified date or upon the occur-
rence of a predetermined event. 7 6 ULPA § 17(l) provides that a limited
partner is liable to the partnership:
(a) for the difference between his contribution as actually made and that
stated in the certificate as having been made, and (b) for any unpaid
contribution which he agreed in the certificate to make in the future at the
time and on the conditions stated in the certificate.
Possible reasons for requiring additional contributions include foreseeable
circumstances, such as funding periodic payments required under a mortgage
or other purchase arrangement and funding a plan for new purchases of
certain required items or additional investments each year for a specified
number of years. Additional contributions might also be needed for such
unforeseen circumstances as cash flow deficits, replacements required dis a
result of uninsured casualty losses, or unanticipated investment
opportunities.
Special considerations involved in providing for additional contributions
include the disclosure policies of the various securities regulatory agencies.
Any additional mandatory assessments must be disclosed as a material item in
any sale of limited partnership interests registered under the Securities Act of
1933. 7 Similarly, the Midwest Securities Commissioners Association State-
ment of Policy Regarding Real Estate Programs provides at section VII(H)
that in any program other than a non-specified property program, a provision
for assessability to meet deficiencies in cash flow caused by debt service,
operating expenses, taxes, or special governmental assessments may be
included in the program agreement, provided that the assessments are used
only for that purpose. 78 Section VII(I) sets out the types of default provisions
which may accompany the failure to pay the assessments. 179 The Texas
Guidelines at rule G(8) set similar criteria for assessments. 80
175. ULPA § 17(4) (TULPA § 18(d)).
176. See notes 37-38 supra.
177. Securities Act Form S-I, 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 7122, at 6201 (1976).
178. 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 4821, at 647 (1976). For non-specified property programs,
CAL. ADMIN. CODE rule 260.140.115.6, 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 8626, at 4553-13 (1975) states:
"Programs calling for assessments shall not be allowed." Otherwise, CAL. ADMIN. CODE rule
260.140.116.8, 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 8626, at 4553-16 (1975), allows certain assessments to
be provided for.
179. 1 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 4821, at 647 (1976).
180. 8. Assessments
a. In the case of specified Income Property Programs, the Program agreement
may provide for Assessments to meet all foreseen and unforeseen costs of the
Program, including operating deficits and governmental and quasi-governmental
assessments and the obligations of a defaulting Participant, provided the aggre-
gate Assessments during the life of the Program do not exceed 25% of the
Participants' initial Capital Contribution. Assessability must be limited to the
foregoing obligations, and all amounts derived from Assessments must be applied
only to satisfaction of the obligations set forth above.
b. In the case of specified Unimproved Property Programs and certain
specified Income Property Programs in which major capital improvements are
planned and fully disclosed in the Prospectus, the Program agreement may
provide for Assessments to meet all foreseen costs of the Program and unfore-
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Securities laws pose particular problems in terms of registration of offer-
ings. Some states consider that the decision to make each of the periodic
contributions called for by the agreement is a new and separate investment
decision which requires registration under the blue sky laws of that particular
state. If a registered broker-dealer is selling the limited partnership interests
and the partnership agreement provides for periodic capital contributions, the
broker-dealer may be in violation of regulation T'8' promulgated by the
Federal Reserve Board under section 7(c) of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934182 because of a March 1972 interpretation issued by the Federal Reserve
Board which held that "tax shelter programs" providing for payments to be
made in installments would constitute arranging for the extension of credit in
violation of regulation T. 83 In addition, the broker-dealer must be careful of §
I l(d)(l) of the Securities Exchange Act 8 4 which prohibits a person who is
both a broker and a dealer from arranging credit on a new issue of se-
curities.'85 For this reason, when preparing an offering the parties should
investigate the current status of the regulations relating to the extension of
credit and other developments.
Another practical consideration is the problem of enforcing the partner-
ship's right to force a limited partner to make the mandatory assessment. If
the right to make assessments is disclosed to the investor before he becomes a
limited partner and the method for enforcing them has been agreed upon by
the limited partners, the partnership's right to the assessment is enforceable
in court. A few other methods that might be used are: (1) allowing non-
defaulting limited partners and the general partner to put in an amount equal
to the uncollected assessment as a capital contribution and adjusting interests
accordingly; (2) giving partners an option of treating all contributions made as
being on behalf of the defaulting limited partner as a loan, with specified
interest and terms; (3) allowing the general partner to loan money to the
partnership on behalf of the defaulting limited partner with the defaulting
limited partner or his agent signing a note to the general partner for the amount
of the loan at a specified interest and term; payment of such note could
possibly be secured by a security interest in the limited partnership; (4)
providing that any partner who makes a loan beyond his pro rata share of the
assessment will have an income preference until he has been repaid by the
partnership.
seen costs such as governmental or quasi-governmental special assessments and
the obligations of a defaulting Participant. Such arrangements shall be subject to
the following conditions:
(I) The period of Assessments shall coincide with the anticipated cash needs of
the Program.
(2) Selling commissions upon Assessments ordinarily will not be permitted but
in no event may be collected until payment is made.
(3) The actual amount of an Assessment may not exceed 125% of the amount
projected for that period in the Prospectus.
3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 46,609, at 42,528 (1976).
181. 12 C.F.R. §§ 220.1-.129 (1976), 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 22,201-87 (1976).
182. Securities Exchange Act of 1934, § 7(c), 15 U.S.C. § 78g(c) (1970).
183. 12 C.F.R. § 220.124 (1976), 2 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 22,282, at 16,174 (1976).
184. 15 U.S.C. § 78k(d)(1) (1970).
185. Id.
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D. Transfer of Partnership Interests
Several provisions in ULPA relate to the right to assign interests. Section
19186 states that a limited partner's interest is assignable, and further provides
for making an assignee a "substituted limited partner" and sets out the rights
and duties of assignees and substituted limited partners. Section 8 allows
admission of additional limited partners subject to certain formalities, 87
while section 9188 restricts the power of the general partner to admit persons as
either general or limited partners.
ULPA is not exclusive in regulating transfers of limited partnership inter-
ests. Many securities regulatory agencies have issued guidelines governing
transfers and assignments. For example, the Midwest Securities Commis-
sioners Association Statement of Policy Regarding Real Estate Programs
section VII(E)189 provides for admission of participants (original participants
and substituted limited partners) and recognition of assignees. It provides, as
to substituted limited partners, that the limited partnership certificate must be
amended once each calendar quarter to effect a substitution of participants.
Moreover, the amendments to proposed article III, § 3 of the NASD Rules of
Fair Practice '9 provide that member firms shall not underwrite or participate
in a distribution which imposes restrictions on assignment of a participant's
program interest except for the approval by the sponsor of the transfer unless
such restriction conflicts with any law of the state in which it was
organized. 191
1. Limited Partners-Special Considerations. Most publicly sold limited
partnership agreements contain very specific language for substitution of
limited partners as well as specific restrictions on the transferability of the
interest of the limited partner. In addition, most public limited partnership
agreements provide that any assignment will become effective at a certain
specified time either upon the filing of the amendments or upon the delivery
of the executed assignments to the general partner, an important considera-
tion because both the limited partners and the limited partnership want to
know when to change their accounting records. 192 Without a specific grant of
authority, ULPA probably requires that any substitution take place only after
approval by all of the limited partners, except, of course, the assignor.' 93 For
this reason, a number of limited partnership agreements only require the
approval of the assignee by the general partner subject to section 9 before that
person may become a substituted limited partner. A number of agreements,
however, also provide that the failure to comply technically with the regula-
tions for assigning an interest renders the assignment void. Therefore, in
order to comply with ULPA §§ 9 and 19, most publicly offered limited
186. TULPA § 20.
187. TULPA § 9.
188. TULPA § 10.
189. I CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 4821, at 646 (1975). Texas guidelines have essentially the
same requirements as Midwest. See 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 46,609, at 42,527 (1976).
190. REAL ESTATE SECURITIES GUIDELINES '73, at 164 (1973).
191. Id.
192. See notes 35-45 supra and accompanying text.
193. ULPA §§ 9, 19 (TULPA §§ 10, 20).
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partnership agreements specifically authorize the general partner to approve
the proposed assignee limited partner and to execute an amendment to that
effect in the limited partnership certificate.1
94
The failure of the limited partner to heed the restrictions in the limited
partnership agreement may render him liable to the partnership for damages
in the event a dispute arises between the assignee and the limited partnership.
In addition, an assignment in such cases may be voidable, depending on how
the restriction provisions were written, but, in any event, entitles the assignee
only to the specific items referred to in ULPA § 19.19 Although these
restrictions on transfer may at first appear harsh, they actually serve an
important role by modifying the free transferability element which is a part of
the inquiry conducted by tax agencies to determine the tax status of the
limited partnership.1%
2. General Partners-Special Considerations. Absent provisions in the cer-
tificate of limited partnership, the assignment by the general partner of his
interest in the limited partnership will cause a dissolution of the limited
partnership. 197 Because the investors in the limited partnership are looking to
the general partner for experience, and are depending on the general partner's
credit to pull the partnership through financially, the custom in large limited
partnerships is to permit the general partner only limited rights of assignment
and, in some cases, only if the new general partner has a net worth almost
equal that of the present general partner.
In the event of the assignment of interest by the general partner, the general
partner remains at least secondarily liable, absent an agreement, for the
obligations of the partnership incurred prior to the date of assignment.
Accordingly, the general partner who assigns his interest is well advised to
obtain releases of liability on all substantial debts and liabilities, or at least to
obtain an indemnity agreement from the partnership and the remaining
general partner.198 A security arrangement for such an indemnity plan might
also be appropriate.
3. Removal and Substitution of the General Partner. Several difficult ques-
tions arise when the interest transferred is that of the general partner who has
been removed by the limited partners. Since limited liability is basic to the
limited partner's decision to invest in a limited partnership, perhaps the
greatest problem facing limited partners in removing a general partner is the
194. See notes 221-36 infra and accompanying text.
195. ULPA § 19(3) provides:
An assignee, who does not become a substituted limited partner, has no right to
require any information or account of the partnership transactions or to inspect
the partnership books; he is only entitled to receive the share of the profits or
other compensation by way of income, or the return of his contribution, to which
his assignor would otherwise be entitled.
196. If a partner can assign only his right to share in profits, but cannot, without the consent of
other members, assign his right to participate in management (i.e., make the assignee a substitute
limited partner), the characteristic of free transferability does not exist. Treas. Reg. §§ 301.7701-
2(e)(1) (1965), -3(b)(2) example (1) (1960). The IRS, however, refuses to rule on whether an
assignee who is not a substitute limited partner is entitled to an allocable share of losses. But see
Evans v. Commissioner, 447 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1971).
197. ULPA § 20 (TULPA § 21).
198. See, e.g., Korn v. Franchard Corp., 388 F. Supp. 1326 (S.D.N.Y. 1975).
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control problem. As noted earlier, the better view is that the power to remove
a malfeasant general partner is not the same as the right to conduct the
business without a general partner; hence, it does not involve control.199
Another major problem involves the exchange of interests in the partner-
ship. The limited partners may buy out the general partner's interest, but such
a transfer may cause valuation problems, especially when the removed
general partner contributed only services.2 0° Consequently, the agreement
should provide a method of evaluating the general partner's services. 20 1
Another question concerns the nature of the interest which is transferred to
a limited partner: is the financial exposure of a partner determined by his
status or the interest purchased? This question arises when the general
partner wants to retain an interest in the venture as a limited partner. If the
removed general partner had made no cash contribution, there may be some
difficulty in transforming his interest into that of a limited partner, especially
considering ULPA § 4 which provides: "The contributions of a limited
partner may be cash or other property, but not services. ,20 2 Furthermore,
since the departing general partner will remain liable on pre-removal transac-
tions, he may seek an indemnity provision. Similarly, the new general partner
will probably want to be indemnified against claims arising from his predeces-
sor's activities, particularly where such claims arise from a violation of the
securities acts, a state blue sky law, or a common law fraud charge.
E. The General Partner as Agent for the Partnership
1. The Agency Situation. The general partner is the agent for the limited
partners in managing the business of the partnership, based upon both the
Uniform Partnership Act (UPA) and ULPA. ULPA § 9 provides: "A general
partner shall have all the rights and powers and be subject to all the
restrictions of a partner in a partnership without limited partners .... -203
The ULPA reference to powers of a partner requires reference to UPA. UPA
§ 9 provides:
[Partner Agent of Partnership as to Partnership Business.] (1) Every
partner is an agent of the partnership for the purpose of its business, and
the act of every partner, including the execution in the partnership name
of any instrument, for apparently carrying on in the usual way the
business of the partnership of which he is a member binds the partner-
ship, unless the partner so acting has in fact no authority to act for the
partnership in the particular matter, and the person with whom he is
dealing has knowledge of the fact that he has no such authority.2 °4
The authority of the general partner to act as agent for the partnership has
been restricted statutorily, but it can also be restricted by agreement of the
199. BROMBERG § 26, at 147-48 n.37; Augustine, supra note 81; Brodsky, supra note 91;
Comment, "Control" in the Limited Partnership, 7 J. MAR. J. PRAC. & PROc. 416 (1974).
200. Roulac, supra note 24, at 295-96.
201. See Midwest Sec. Comm'rs Ass'n Statement of Policy § VII(B), I CCH BLUE SKY L.
REP. 4821, at 645-3 (1976), which states: "The agreement should provide for a method of
valuation of the general partner's interest, upon removal of the general partner, that would not be
unfair to the participants."
202. TULPA § 5.
203. TULPA § 10.
204. TUPA § 9 (emphasis added).
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parties. Indeed, ULPA provides that the general partner has no authority
without consent of the limited partners to do any of the following:
20 5
(1) acts in contravention of the certificate (this provision recognizes the
right of the partnership to restrict the general partner);
(2) acts which would make it impossible to carry on the ordinary business
of the partnership;
(3) confess a judgment against the partnership;
(4) possess partnership property, or assign his rights in specific partnership
property, for other than a partnership purpose;
(5) admit a person as a general partner;
(6) admit a person as a limited partner, unless the right so to do is given in
the certificate;
(7) continue the business with partnership property on the death, retire-
ment, or insanity of a general partner, unless the right so to do is given in the
certificate.
ULPA makes restrictions of the general partner available through § 9(1)(a)
which allows restrictions on general partner authority to be placed in the
certificate. 20 Yet, placement of restrictions in the certificate may or may not
have an effect upon third parties' reliance on the authority of a general partner
because it is unclear whether a third party without actual knowledge can be
bound by certificate restrictions he has never seen. Except in the most
unusual case, a third party will not be able to examine the certificate to
determine the general partner's authority to act for the partnership.
2. Fiduciary Duties of the General Partner. The courts have imposed
fiduciary responsibility on the general partner for his management of the
limited partners' investments. The policy reasons for this fiduciary duty are
obvious ;2°7 the general partner has plenary power in relation to limited
partners. In a similar circumstance a very high standard of care has been
thought necessary to prevent the investor from being at the mercy of the
managing agent's unfettered discretion. Thus, a fiduciary duty is imposed on
corporate directors 0 8 and trustees of trust funds. 2°9 In non-limited partner-
ships with a greater ability to control held by each co-partner, the standard of
care may not be as strict. 210
The fiduciary duty also has a statutory basis. The ULPA § 9 reference to
205. ULPA §§ 9()(a)-(g) (TULPA §§ 10(a)(l)-(7)).
206. TULPA § 10(a)(1).
207. See Roulac, supra note 24, at 287.
208. H. HENN, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS AND OTHER BUSINESS ENTERPRISES
§ 236 (2d ed. 1970).
209. 2 A. ScoTT, TRUSTS § 170, at 1297 (3d ed. 1967).
210. BROMBERG § 68, at 395 states: "Although a partner owes a duty of faithful services to the
best of his ability, he is not held to possess the degree of knowledge and skill of a paid agent."
The footnote further states:
A paid agent is under a duty to his principal to act with standard care and with the
skill standard in the locality for the kind of work which he is employed to perform,
and in addition to exercise any special skill which he has. He is liable for losses
caused by failure to conform to this duty.
Id. at 395 n.94.
Yet, an exception exists where the management of the business is left to a managing partner.
Johnson v. Buck, 540 S.W.2d 393 (Tex. Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1976); Roulac, supra note 24,
at 288.
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duties of general partners as defined in UPA includes a reference to § 21(l) of
UPA. That section provides:
[Partner Accountable as a Fiduciary.] (1) Every partner must account to
the partnership for any benefit, and hold as trustee for it any profits
derived by him without the consent of the other partners from any
transaction connected with the formation, conduct, or liquidation of the
partnership or from any use by him of its property."'
The securities laws may also require full disclosure to investors.
2 12
Since "fiduciary duty" is a relatively meaningless concept by itself, it must
be defined by the context of the transaction involved. Consequently, the
general partner's fiduciary duties should be examined, considering his duties
as to partnership property, his duties as to the partnership, and his duties as to
the individual partners.
As the concept of fiduciary duties is a familiar problem in corporation law,
most fiduciary principles would apply equally in the limited partnership
context.2"3 The general partner should be generally aware of his duties of good
faith, loyalty, and due care in the best interests of the partnership. He should
also be aware that the following acts by a general partner may be held to be
breaches of his fiduciary duty, creating liability to either the partnership or to
individual partners:
(1) acting contrary to the partnership agreement;214
211. TUPA§21(l).
212. Item 6 under Preparation of Registration Statements Relating to Interests in Real Estate
Limited Partnerships, 17 C.F.R. § 231.5465, 1 CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 3820, at 3337-38 (1976),
states as follows:
A. A discussion of the fiduciary obligation owed by the General Partner to the
Limited Partners should be set forth. The following disclosure is suggested with
appropriate modification for the laws of the state of organization:
A General Partner is accountable to a limited partnership as a fiduciary and
consequently must exercise good faith and integrity in handling partnership
affairs. This is a rapidly developing and changing area of the law and Limited
Partners who have questions concerning the duties of the General Partner should
consult with their counsel.
B. Where the limited partnership agreement contains an exculpatory provision
and/or the right to indemnification, the following disclosure is suggested, as
modified to reflect the substance of such provisions:
Exculpation
i) The General Partner may not be liable to the Partnership or Limited Partners
for errors in judgment or other acts or omissions not amounting to willful
misconduct or gross negligence, since provision has been made in the Agreement
of Limited Partnership for exculpation of the General Partner. Therefore,
purchasers of the interests have a more limited right of action than they would
have absent the limitation in the Partnership Agreement.
Indemnification
ii) The Partnership Agreement provides for indemnification of the General
Partner by the Partnership for liabilities he incurs in dealings with third parties on
behalf of the partnership. To the extent that the indemnification provisions
purport to include indemnification for liabilities arising under the Securities Act
of 1933, in the opinion of the Securities and Exchange Commission, such
indemnification is contrary to public policy and therefore unenforceable.
Registrant's attention is also directed to Note A of Rule 460 under the Act
relating to disclosure of indemnification agreements.
10 CAL. ADMIN. CODE rule 260.140.118.1, I CCH BLUE SKY L. REP. 8626, at 4553-32 (1974)
provides a similar disclosure requirement. Texas Administrative Gdidelines for Registration of
Real Estate Programs, rule J [065.09.00.0101, Prospectus and Its Contents, provides for a
discussion of the fiduciary duties of the sponsor to the participants. 3 CCH BLUE SKY L. REP.
46,609, at 42,529 (1976).
213. H.HENN, supra note 208, § 235.
214. See ULPA § 9(l)(a) (TULPA § 10(a)(1)).
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(2) taking extra compensation not provided in the agreement;" 5
(3) co-mingling partnership funds;216
(4) not disclosing personal benefits to himself when seeking limited part-
ners in a promotion; 217
(5) not disclosing material facts involving transfers to or from the
partnership ;218
(6) taking a partnership opportunity for his own benefit; 219
(7) deriving personal profit from dealing with the partnership. 220
3. Power of Attorney. The power of a general partner under ULPA § 9 and
UPA § 9 includes the power to execute any instrument in the partnership's
name. 221 Nevertheless, a limited partnership with more than a few limited
partners may find it convenient to give the general partner or a limited partner
a power of attorney for the purpose of carrying out certain ministerial acts,
including the execution of anid swearing to the limited partnership certificate
or amendments thereto. The power of attorney has long been recognized as a
means of creating an agency relationship between parties which confers upon
the agent the authority to perform certain specified acts or kinds of acts on
behalf of the principal. 222 The purpose of the power of attorney is to evidence
the authority of the agent to third parties with whom the agent deals.2 23
Generally, the law of the jurisdiction in which the contract creating the power
of attorney is made controls the effects of a power of attorney.2 2 4 No
universal form has been created either judicially or by custom, however, as is
evident from the number of different forms found in public offerings.
The power of attorney should be clear on its face because the principal who
granted the power of attorney is not going to be present when questions
concerning the power are raised. It should clearly indicate the powers to be
exercised by the agent, should evidence its own authenticity, and should
clearly designate the party who is going to act under the power of attorney.
Furthermore, powers of attorney are generally construed strictly and will be
held to grant only those powers which are specified; nevertheless, a strict
construction will not be invoked to destroy the very purpose for which the
power of attorney was granted. 2 5
Termination and Revocation. If a power of attorney is given to and is
retained by the agent and exhibited to third persons, the termination of the
agent's authority by causes other than incapacity or impossibility does not
prevent him from having apparent authority as to persons to whom he exhibits
the document and who have no notice of termination. 226 The death or
215. Bassan v. Investment Exch. Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 922, 524 P.2d 233 (1974).
216. McGlynn v. Shultz, 90 N.J. Super. 505, 218 A.2d 408 (App. Div. 1966).
217. Newburger, Loeb & Co. v. Gross, 365 F. Supp. 1364 (S.D.N.Y. 1973).
218. Allen v. Steinberg, 244 Md. 119, 223 A.2d 240 (1966).
219. Bassan v. Investment Exch. Corp., 83 Wash. 2d 922, 524 P.2d 233 (1974).
220. Id.
221. UPA§9(TUPA§9).
222. 2A C.J.S. Agency § 44 (1972).
223. 3 AM. JUR. 2d Agency § 23 (1962).
224. Id. § 25.
225. Id. § 29.
226. Id. § 130.
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incapacity of the principal terminates the authority of the agent with three
exceptions .227 If the authority or power of attorney is coupled with an interest,
it is not revocable by the act, condition, or death of the principal. 228 Powers
given for consideration are generally revocable.
229
Capacity To Act as Agent. Any legal entity has capacity to hold a power to
act on behalf of another. 230 A corporation, for example, may act as an agent
for an individual person or for another corporation. 23' Although a person
whose interests are adverse to those of another can be authorized to act on
behalf of the other, it is a breach of duty for him not to reveal the adverse
interests to the principal. 232 Unless otherwise agreed, an agent is also subject
to a duty not to deal with his principal as an adverse party in a transaction
connected with his agency without the principal's knowledge. 233 An agent
acting for multiple principals must deal fairly with all and reveal this con-
flict. 234 Since potential conflicts may arise between the general partner and
the limited partners and may cause a situation where the general partner
cannot act without breaching his duty to the limited partners, the principal
may wish to give an agent in the power of attorney the right to substitute
another in the agent's place or the power to name a third party to act as agent
when the original agent is precluded from acting by a conflict of interest.
Contents of Power of Attorney. Generally these powers of attorney contain
the following items:
(1) the name of the party acting (including his successors and assigns);
(2) the authority to make, execute, swear to, acknowledge, amend, file,
record, deliver, or publish:
(a) any limited partnership certificate;
(b) any counterpart or amendment to the certificate of limited partner-
ship for the purpose of substituting limited partners, for the purpose of
recording, or for the purpose of qualifying or continuing the limited
partnership;
(c) assumed name certificates;
(d) certificates of dissolution;
(e) other limited partnership agreements;
(3) an expression of the irrevocable nature of the relationship.2 35
A series of questions are raised, particularly in a large public limited
partnership offering, when it becomes necessary to rely on the power of
attorney for authority to execute the limited partnership certificate for
purposes of filing the certificate in a number of states and to take other actions
227. Id. §§ 120, 122. Texas now recognizes the continuation of a power of attorney notwith-
standing the later disability of the principal. TEX. PROB. CODE ANN. § 36A (Supp. 1976-77).
228. Womack v. Stegner, 293 S.W.2d 124 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
229. Sunshire v. Manos, 496 S.W.2d 195 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1973, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
230. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 21 (1958).
231. 3 AM. JUR. 2d Agency § 13 (1962).
232. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 23 (1958).
233. Id. § 389.
234. Id. § 392.
235. For example: The power of attorney hereby granted shall be deemed to be coupled with
an interest and shall be irrevocable and survive the death or disability of the undersigned and shall
extend to the undersigned's heirs, successors and assigns.
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on behalf of the limited partnership. The primary questions, of course,
concern the validity of the power. Does it make any difference if the general
partner is given the power? How does a corporation swear to a certificate?
Does the certificate sworn to by an attorney-in-fact comply with section 2 of
ULPA?
A person subject to a duty can properly appoint an agent to perform the act
or accomplish the result unless public policy or an agreement requires
personal performance. 23 6 Duties or privileges created by statutes may be
imposed or conferred upon a person to be performed or exercised only by
himself. Whether a statute is interpreted in such a manner depends upon
whether in view of the purpose of the statute the knowledge, consent, or
judgment of a particular individual is required. Unless an overriding public
policy requires that the actual limited partners sign and swear to the certifi-
cate for the limited partnership, however, it seems generally accepted that the
signing and swearing to the certificate may be delegated to an agent.
F. Qualification of Foreign Limited Partnerships
The basic question involving foreign limited partnerships is whether a
limited partnership, having been properly formed in one state, the master
state, is required to qualify in a foreign state in order to be recognized as a
limited partnership and to have the limited liability status of its limited
partners recognized. ULPA makes no provision for qualification or recogni-
tion of foreign limited partnerships, and only a few states have statutes which
relate to foreign limited partnerships. The absence of statutory guidelines in
most jurisdictions subjects interstate limited partnership transactions to
potential risks because the limited partnership, unlike a general partnership,
is exclusively a creature of statute, and because of the strictness with which
limited partnership statutes have been construed by some states' courts.
The importance of qualifying the partnership in a foreign state can be better
understood from a discussion of the theories underlying the certificate filing
requirement as it relates to the existence of the limited partnership in the
master state. As noted above, unlike the general partnership which existed at
common law, the limited partnership is exclusively a creature of statute, and
compliance with the statute is technically required in order to create the
entity. Nevertheless, in many instances there are problems which result from
failure to file. The failure may be either an absolute failure to file, a late filing
which occurs after the business has commenced, or an erroneous filing. It
appears that the primary reason for the certificate requirement is to give
notice to third parties of the limited liability of certain partners, rather than to
create the entity.237 Thus, the ultimate problem involved in the failure-to-file
situation is to protect the limited liability of limited partners while still
protecting third parties. Section 2(2)238 of ULPA affords some relief from
failure to file problems by requiring only substantial good faith compliance
with the formalities in order to create a valid limited partnership. It would be
236. One author expresses some reservations about use of a power of attorney because of the
nature of the sworn certificate. Heyman & Parnall, Use (or Abuse) of the Limited Partnership in
Financing Real Estate Ventures in New Mexico, 3 N.M.L. REV. 251, 252 n.7 (1973).
237. Note, Regulation of Foreign Limited Partnerships, 52 B.U.L. REV. 64 (1972).
238. TULPA § 3(b).
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difficult to argue, however, that one has substantially complied with ULPA §
2(2) if no certificate is filed. Likewise, there may be difficult third party
reliance problems if, for example, a construction contract is signed on behalf
of the limited partnership, or drilling commences on a well, before the
certificate is filed.
While some may argue that a failure to file means that a limited partnership
has not been formed, 39 it is generally agreed that the failure does not
automatically convert the limited partnership into a general partnership. 240
Under ULPA it is recognized that the limited partner is not essentially a
general partner regardless of non-compliance with the filing requirements,
and is not generally liable unless he acts like a general partner. 24' Indeed,
ULPA § 11 provides that a person who believes himself to be a limited partner
is not, by reason of his exercise of the rights of a limited partner, a general
partner with the person or in the partnership carrying on the business, or
bound by the obligations of such person or partnership; provided that on
ascertaining the mistake he promptly renounces his interest in the profits
of the business, or other compensation by way of income.
Based on section 11, it appears that in the event of a failure to file, the only
way a person who believes himself to be a limited partner and who does not
exercise control can relieve himself of liability is to renounce the benefits of
the association upon ascertaining the mistake. 242 From a policy viewpoint,
this provision provides maximum protection for the limited partners while
affording the creditors the protection of whatever profits may be left over.
Conversely, the wording of section I I also suggests that if a limited partner
does not renounce his interests, he may be liable as a general partner of the
partnership.
The question then raised, because the limited partnership is a de jure
organization, is whether the limited liability should be recognized in a foreign
state in which the ULPA § 2 formalities have not been met, even though there
was a proper filing in the master state. 243 Under the traditional analysis the
fundamental question is whether to classify the existence of the limited
partnership as a matter inter se or a matter involving third party relations. The
general rule, which is supported by several writers, is that so long as the
limited partner did not take part in control or hold himself out as a general
partner, the law of the place where the limited partnership was formed should
govern the question of limited liability. 244 Thus, a partnership which had filed
239. SeeTaubman, Limited Partnerships, 3 CORP. PRAC. COMM., Feb. 1962, at 15, 23. See also
Tiburon Nat'l Bank v. Wagner, 265 Cal. App. 2d 868, 71 Cal. Rptr. 832 (1968); Widder v. Leeds,
317 A.2d 32 (Del. Ch. 1974); Hoefer v. Hall, 75 N.M. 751,411 P.2d 230 (1965); Holvey v. Stewart,
509 P.2d 17 (Ore. 1973).
240. BROMBERG § 26. But seeCheyenne Oil Corp. v. Oil & Gas Ventures, Inc., 42 Del. Ch. 100,
204 A.2d 743 (Sup. Ct. 1964) (loss of limited liability is the only sanction for failure to file a
certificate).
241. ULPA § 7 (TULPA § 8). See also ULPA § 5(a) (TULPA § 6(b)); ULPA § 6 (TULPA § 7).
242. TULPA § 12. A split of authority has developed over the applicability of ULPA § I I to
protect limited partners in situations where the limited partnership committed some act which
caused its certificate to become ineffective. See Graybar Elec. Co. v. Lowe, I I Ariz. App. 116,
462 P.2d 413 (1969); Vulcan Furniture Mfg. Corp. v. Vaughn, 168 So. 2d 760 (Fla. App. 1964).
243. See also Kratovil & Werner, Fixing up the Old Jalopy-The Modern Limited Partnership
Under the ULPA, 50 ST. JOHN'S L. REV. 51, 67 (1975).
244. See, e.g., Note, supra note 237, at 68. See also Gilman Paint & Varnish Co. v. Legum, 197
Md. 665, 80 A.2d 906 (1951).
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in the master state would have limited liability even as to out-of-state
transactions. Although there is authority for the proposition that a limited
partnership formed in one state is a legal entity that must be recognized, 245
several authors suggest that in order to place creditors on notice of the limited
partnership status, which a court may well determine to be of such signifi-
cance as to require filing of the certificate, the certificate should be filed in
each state in which the limited partnership does significant business.
246
The best solution yet proposed to deal with this interstate muddle is the
process of qualification. 247 "Qualification" generally means the filing of the
partnership certificate in the foreign state and paying the required registration
fees. To date there are eight states that have some type of statute which
relates to foreign limited partnerships: Florida, 248 Hawaii, 249 Idaho, 25° Kan-
sas, 251 Kentucky, 252 Maine, 2 3 New Hampshire, 254 and Oregon. 25 5 The Texas
secretary of state has promulgated the following rule to deal with the problem.
[Limited Partnership Rule 004.40.00.005].
[Foreign Limited Partnerships].
A copy (having genuine signatures and seals) of a certificate of a
limited partnership agreement which has been entered into and/or filed
in another state may be filed for record in the Office of the Secretary of
State of the State of Texas if the certificate is in substantial compliance
with The Texas Uniform Limited Partnership Act as heretofore set
out. A certificate is not in substantial compliance with the Texas Act if
it contains a statement that it is filed pursuant to the laws of another
state and does not also contain a statement that it is being filed
pursuant to the laws of Texas. 2
56
Because many other states' legislatures are taking action regarding qualifica-
tion, it is suggested that before establishing contacts with a state in which a
partnership may wish to do business the laws of that state be examined to
determine its qualification procedures.
A comparison of qualification statutes of the states named above reveals
several different ways of treating the problem.
Filing Required. The filing required is usually a copy of the original certificate
filed in the master state. Kentucky presents unique problems since it has only
recently adopted ULPA. 257 Previously, the Kentucky practice had been,
rather than requiring a filing of the ULPA § 2 certificate of limited partner-
245. See Cheyenne Oil Corp. v. Oil & Gas Ventures, Inc., 42 Del. Ch. 100, 204 A.2d 743 (Sup.
Ct. 1964), in which a New Jersey limited partnership which did business in Arkansas and Texas
without filing was nevertheless able to sue as a limited partnership as to transactions in Arkansas
and Texas.
246. BROMBERG § 26; 2 Z. CAVITCH, supra note 15, §§ 39.05[2][b]-[d]; Kratovil & Werner,
supra note 243, at 67.
247. See Comment, supra note 88.
248. FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 620.40-.49 (Supp. 1976-77).
249. HAWAll REV. STAT. §§ 425-71 to -77 (Supp. 1975).
250. IDAHO CODE § 53-306(2) (1957).
251. KAN. STAT. ANN. §§ 56-123b, c (Supp. 1975).
252. Ky. REV. STAT. § 362.095 (Supp. 1976).
253. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 181 (Supp. 1973).
254. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. 88 305-A:1-:8 (1966).
255. ORE. REV. STAT. §§ 69.440, .450 (1975).
256. S/S HANDBOOK 344.
257. Ky. REV. STAT. §§ 362.420-700 (1972).
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ship, to file a certified copy of the articles of partnership. In contrast, New
Hampshire requires "registration" with the secretary of state and designation
of a registered agent, but does not set forth any certificate filing
requirements." 8
Effect of Filing. The effect of filing in a foreign state may be either recognition
of the limited partnership under the master state's laws25 9 or subjection of the
limited partnership to the foreign state's laws. 260 The effect of failure to file in
a foreign state varies according to the state. General liability results in several
of the qualification states, but if forfeiture of limited liability for failure to file
a certificate is deemed necessary due to the de jure nature of limited
partnerships, then possibly some type of indemnification by the general
partners to the limited partners should be provided. Penalties,261 as opposed
to loss of limited liability for failure to file, may be a better solution for two
reasons. First, modern limited partnerships may consist of hundreds of
limited partners residing in numerous states. To place the burden of qualify-
ing the limited partnership on these individuals seems impractical and inequi-
table. Second, activities by the limited partners in attempting to qualify the
limited partnership might be held to constitute "taking part in the control of
the business ' 262 which would result in loss of limited liability. 263 In the
jurisdictions in which statutes are silent as to penalties or general liability, the
matter is left to the courts which may resolve the matter by interpreting
ULPA § 11 to allow a limited partner the right to renounce his interest in
profits to avoid general liability if the partnership has failed to qualify. 26
Miscellaneous Provisions. Florida requires that the qualifying limited partner-
ship have "Limited" or "Ltd" as part of its name.26 Kansas requires the
submission of annual reports upon penalty of loss of limited liability.26 Maine
applies the master state's laws to the qualifying partnership, except on the
question of "control. 267
III. CONCLUSION
In this Article various aspects of planning and operation of a limited
partnership have been explored. Due to its survey approach, many problems
have not been discussed in the depth which many practitioners might prefer.
It is hoped, however, that the discussion of the various problems will aid in
the resolution of difficulties if only by pointing to other sources.
The law of limited partnerships is new, and consequently it is difficult to
258. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 305-A:1 (Supp. 1973).
259. Idaho, Maine.
260. Florida, Hawaii, Kansas, New Hampshire, Oregon.
261. HAWAII REV. STAT. § 425-76 (Supp. 1975).
262. ULPA § 7 (TULPA § 8).
263. See notes 80-95 supra and accompanying text.
264. See note 242 supra.
265. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 620.05 (1956).
266. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 56-123a (Supp. 1975). See also HAWAII REV. STAT. § 425-50 (Supp.
1975).
267. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 31, § 181 (Supp. 1973).
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answer many questions in the area, a number of which have arisen for the first
time. Perhaps the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act will eliminate
most of the difficulties in planning. Until that time attorneys must be aware
that limited partnership planning will not be an easy task.
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